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HARDROCK MINERALS, ENERGY MINERALS,
AND OTHER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC
LANDS: THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
Robert L. Glicksmant
George Cameron Cogginstt

Mineral law in the United States always has been closely related to public

land law. The reason is simple: most large ore bodies have been found on lands
that were-and in many cases still are-owned by the federal government. For

a century, federal mineral law was considered a subject unto itself, independent
of any other public land policy priorities. That is no longer the case. Instead,
federal minerals are only one of several federal resources available for disposition or allocation. Mineral extraction now is seldom universally considered the

highest and best use of the land, overshadowing all other values.
This article traces the evolution of federal public land and resource law,
emphasizing developments pertinent to the minerals industries. The first section

provides, in a somewhat jaundiced fashion, a summary of the law as it exists in
1998. Subsequent sections outline the chronology of public land developments

since the birth of the Republic.
I. THE TROUBLE WrTH FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAW iN 1998
The United States in 1998 owns roughly 660 million acres of land in fee,

plus less-than-fee interests in many millions more acres, and it controls the seas
and seabeds from three to 200 miles offshore.' Only a small fraction of the

t Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. This article is a revised and expanded version of a
paper delivered to the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation's conference on Public Land Law II in Denver, Colorado, on November 14, 1997. The authors express their gratitude to Jenna Wiehel, University of
Kansas law student, for her excellent research assistance in preparing this paper.
tt Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas. The authors apologize, sort of, for the plethora of
references to their own works. Those works are as authoritative as any other, however, and the method is
convenient.
I. See generally 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 1:0112] (1990) [hereinafter PNRL]. References to PNRL include all three volumes of the
treatise and the 19 updating Releases published to date.
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government's holdings are devoted to traditional governmental uses such as
forts, courthouses, and post offices. The great bulk of the federal lands are
under the jurisdiction of four main (and many other lesser) government agencies
located in several departments. Those lands are divided into five major national
"systems"--parks, forests, wildlife refuges, BLM public lands, and wilderness-each of which is further subdivided into many management categories.2
The "nongovernmental" federal lands are to be managed for seven major, overlapping resources or uses: water, minerals, timber, livestock forage, wildlife,
recreation, and preservation.3
Traditional public land law comprised those legal rules and doctrines by
which the public domain lands were transferred to states and private entities.4
Because very few such transactions now occur, the term "public land law" is
obsolete; "federal public natural resources law" is a far more accurate description of current law in this area.'
In many respects, federal public natural resources law in 1998 is an unholy
mess. First, there is just too damn much of it: an estimated 3,000 statutes, plus
volumes of regulations, voluminous jurisprudence, agency manuals, arcane doctrines, and thousands of books and articles. Despite this bulk, Congress has
ducked many important questions by enacting gobbledygook laws, such as the
Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA),6 which use all the right words to
say virtually nothing.7 Some federal laws apply to all of the federal natural
resources," but each resource is governed by series of separate laws as well.
The allocation mechanism for each federal resource also differs drastically:
• water is "appropriated"
"hardrock minerals are "located"
• fuel minerals are "leased" (and each of the half dozen or so leasing
systems differs sharply from the others in some respects9 )
"common minerals are "sold"
"timber is obtained by "contract"
"forage is allocated by "permit"
"commercial access is pursuant to a "right-of-way"

2. See id. § 7.02[1].
3. The typography is taken from GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS Er AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND

RESOURCES LAW (3d ed. 1992).
4. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 1.0212].
5. Id. § 1.0213][a].
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
7. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 16.01-.02.
8. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
9. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 24.03.
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" hunters and fishermen need written "licenses"

* other recreationists have "implied licenses"
"and the interest of preservationists does not yet have a label.
In each case, the quantum or degree of property right devolving upon the
resource recipient also differs drastically. A water right is usufructuary and
dependent;' ° an unpatented mining claim is defeasible;" a mineral lease may
be conditional;' 2 a grazing permit is (theoretically) a mere privilege;13 and so
4

on.'

Much public natural resources law is ambiguous if not incomprehensible.
Standardless delegations of legislative power abound; 5 unreal distinctions are
prominent;' 6 jurisdictional boundaries often are questionable; 7 over- and

underinclusion is common, as are overlapping provisions and doctrines;' doctrines are undemocratic;' 9 much law is obsolete;2" and a lot is unfair." Eco-

nomically, the structure of the law is ridden with unjustifiable preferences,
subsidies, and advantages for the privileged few. Consider the following:
- hardrock miners pay nothing for valuable minerals and $5 per acre for
fee title to the claim
" national park patrons pay very low access fees
"national park concessionaires pay even lower fees, proportionately2
* western irrigators are heavily subsidized
"federal timber sales consistently lose money
" recreational access to most federal holdings is free
" western ranchers pay less than $.05 a day to feed a half-ton cow

10. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (1991).
11. See ROCKY MT.MIN. L FOUND., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 46.01[1] (Cheryl Outerbridge ed.,
2d ed. 1997).
12. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
13. See, ag., 3 PNRL, supranote 1, § 19.0211].
14. See generally id. § 19.03.
15. See I PNRL, supra note 1, § 6.01[3].
16. See, eg., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
17. See id.
18. The bald eagle, for example, is protected by three federal laws while many species are under the
aegis of none.
19. For example, only adjacent landowners (for the most part) qualify for grazing privileges under the
Taylor Act. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994).
20. The most glaring example of obsolescence is the General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-45
(1994).
21. See, e.g., supranote 19.
22. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, ConcessionsLaw and Policy in the National
Park System, 74 DENV.U. L. REV. 729, 757 (1997).
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* surface owners can veto the mining of federal coal
" the government tries to eradicate coyotes, free of charge to the sheep
ranchers
"some noncompetitive leasing lives on
" and states take large shares of sale or lease receipts--up to 90% in
Alaska-not to mention payments in lieu of taxes and dozens of other.
subsidies.2
Add to this somewhat slanted picture the cartographic chaos that characterizes land ownership patterns in the West and the resulting plethora of access
difficulties,2' revolving-door relationships between resource industries, resource
colleges, and federal resource agencies,' the attitudinal perversities that manifest themselves in Western demagoguery,26 the proliferation of procedural requirements, 27 and the ever-present fraud and abuse--these are some of the
reasons why the law as it has evolved can be characterized as an "unholy
mess."
How did this happen? The beginning of this story is the ratification of the
United States Constitution, and the beginning is often a good place to start.
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The year is 1791, and the new Constitution has been ratified by the former
colonies, replacing the Articles of Confederation. The rectangular survey system, featuring sections and townships, had then been in place for decades."
The western boundary of the infant country is the Mississippi River, but most
of what lies beyond the Appalachian chain is unknown to the early Americans.
As a part of the compromise deal that became the Constitution, the original
states with land claims beyond their present boundaries out to the Mississippi
ceded those lands to the new national government?' Thus, at nationhood, the
United States owned roughly half of the territory over which it asserted sovereignty.

23. See I PNRL, supra note 1, § 5.05.
24. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
25. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 Minn. L.
Rev. 869, 916-17 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Fearand Loathing on the FederalLands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647
(1997).
27. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the Federal
Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 307 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Michael I. Jeffery, PublicLands Reform: A Reluctant Leap Into the Abyss, 16 VA. ENVrL.
L.J. 79, 80 (1996).
29. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 10C.07[2][a].
30. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW IN A

NUTSHELL 13 (1995).
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A. The Enclave Clause
The Constitution contains two provisions that define federal land ownership and several more that affect it. Article I, on the powers of the legislative
branch, grants the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and such other lands and facilities that the United States may purchase
with consent of the state where located.3 This "Enclave Clause" is of minor
importance in federal land law because its apparent restrictions (exclusivity,
purchase, purpose, and cession) were interpreted largely out of existence more
than a century ago, 32 because only a small fraction of the federal lands are
held in enclave or quasi-enclave status, 33 and because Congress often has recthe undesirability of excluding application of all state law from any
ognized
34
tract.
B. The Property Clause
The Property Clause in Article IV grants Congress the power to dispose of
and make "needful" rules for property belonging to the United States.35 Although this Clause contains no qualifying language, many long argued that its
true meaning was to require Congress to dispose of any lands the United States
acquired.' This view found some support in the 1845 Pollard'sLessees' decision of the Supreme Court. The Pollard Court held that lands submerged beneath navigable waters automatically became state property upon statehood, a
manifestation of the equal footing notion.3 However anomalous, that is still
the law, subject to certain exceptions? 9 But some language in the nearly
opaque opinion could be construed as opining that the United States had no
legislative powers over federal lands within states and indeed was merely a
trustee bound to dispose of them. 4'
That latter aspect of Pollarddid not survive the 19th century. The Court in
Camfield v. United States4 not only upheld federal power over federal lands, it
also extended the federal Property Clause power to private activities on adjacent
private lands (in that case, fencing) that interfere with federal purposes.42 Light
v. United States,43 in 1911, was even more definitive. The Court plainly stated
that Congress could do whatever it wished for, to, or with federally owned land,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
See COmmINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at 173-81.
See id. at 173.
See, e-g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1994).
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cL 2.
See, e-g., 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 3.03[3][a].
See Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
See id. at 224.
See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 3.03[3][a].
Pertinent portions of the opinion are reproduced at CO-GINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at 58-61.
167 U.S. 518 (1897).
See id. at 536-37.
220 U.S. 523 (1911).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 2

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:765

including permanently reserving it for conservation.'
Still, the states' rightists continued to assert the unconstitutionality of federal ownership or a milder variant of that idea, that the United States as a landowner is merely a landowner and thus is fully subject to state law as is any
other landowner.' New Mexico so argued in the seminal Kleppe v. New Mexico' litigation, decided by a unanimous Court in 1976. Justice Marshall opined
in no uncertain terms that congressional power over the federal lands pursuant
to the Property Clause is complete, unrestricted, plenary, and preemptive.' If
state law conflicts with the federal rule or the federal purpose, it
is preempted.
Period.
That should have been the end of the matter, but some still argue the illegitimacy of federal ownership and the sanctity of state law.' The Sagebrush
Rebels of the 1970s did so, and they lost.49 The Wise Users and County Supremacists of the 1990s are doing the same, and they too have lost and will
continue to lose5
C. The Supremacy Clause
The other provisions of the United States Constitution with a fairly direct
bearing on public natural resources law include the Supremacy Clause in Article
V?51 and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 Kleppe made clear
that federal law, where applicable, ousted contrary state or local law on the
federal lands.5 3 The power of Congress to displace state law thus is beyond
cavil, but the question whether Congress has done so in any particular instance
can be problematic. The general test for preemption is that it will be found if
any one of four conditions is present
54
"Congress explicitly says so,
"Congress intended to occupy the entire regulatory field,5

"the state law directly conflicts with federal law,5 or

44. See id at 527-28.
45. David E. Engdahl, State and FederalPower Over FederalProperty, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 358-76
(1976).
46. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
47. See id. at 543.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. Nevada ex rel. Nevada State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981), affd
on other grounds,699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983).
50. See United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264 (1997); United
States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996), affd, 103 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 54 (1997); Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 1141 (Idaho 1996). See I PNRL,
supra note 1, § 3.03[3].
51. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
52. See id. amend V.
53. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976).
54. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1535(f) (1994).
55. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978).
56. See, e.g., Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 114, 1146 (Idaho 1996).
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state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal
purpose 57
Congress seldom explicitly preempts, and it virtually never tries to occupy,
any entire regulatory field in federal land law (including law applicable to enclaves). Direct conflicts are rare but easy to determine when found. In the 1997
South Dakota Mining Ass'n case,58 for example, the court held that a county
ordinance which barred surface mining activities authorized by the General
Mining Law directly conflicted with that federal law and was therefore preempted.59 The critical inquiry in most preemption cases, therefore, is whether
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes.
The leading modem preemption case in federal natural resources law is
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,' decided by a sharply
divided Court in 1987. Granite Rock located valuable white limestone mining
claims on national forest land. Although the Forest Service approved Granite
Rock's mining plan proposal, the state Coastal Commission insisted that the
company apply for a state permit as well (which it refused to do). In Granite
Rock's suit to prevent enforcement of the state permit requirement, the Ninth
Circuit held that the requirement was preempted, 61 but the Supreme Court reversed.62 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion found no evidence of any preemptive purpose in Forest Service regulations implementing the 1897 Organic
Act. In fact, those regulations affirmatively required compliance with state laws
and regulations.63 Justice O'Connor assumed arguendo that the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 6' and the National Forest Management
Act (NFMA),' the general land planning and management statutes for the
BLM and the Forest Service, preempt the application of state land use plans to
unpatented mining claims in the national forests.' But, drawing a tenuous distinction, she concluded that the two statutes did not preempt state regulation of
federal land use for environmental protection purposes.' Because Granite
Rock never applied for a permit, its facial challenge to the state regulatory
scheme had to fail if any possible set of conditions would be permissible as
environmental regulation.' The state Commission asserted that it merely
sought to impose reasonable environmentally protective regulations, not to ban

57.
(1991).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
South Dakota Min. Ass'n v. Lawrence County, 977 F. Supp. 1396 (D.S.D. 1997).
See id. at 1405-06.
480 U.S. 572 (1987).
See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
See GraniteRock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
See id. at 583 (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.5(b), 228.8(19)).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994).
See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 585.
See id. at 586-87.
See id. at 589.
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mining on federal lands.' The case therefore involved an attempt by the state
to impose nonconflicting environmental standards. 70 The dissenters claimed
that the state permit requirement was duplicative of the Forest Service program
and therefore inherently in conflict with the latter, 7' and that the state permit
scheme was indeed a land use control program and therefore preempted by
federal statute?2 The practical upshot of the Granite Rock decision is that a
resource developer faced with state as well as federal regulatory requirements
will have to go through the state permitting process, perhaps rendering moot or
unwise a further challenge to the specific state restrictions. 3
D. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment74 has had relatively little
impact in federal public natural resources law, despite its notoriety in the area
of private land use control.7 The main reason for this is that the claimant seldom can assert a complete property right to the land or resource at issue because the United States has the ultimate fee interest in the property.76 This
conclusion, however, has not prevented substantial litigation over the question
of exactly when a private property interest in public natural resources arises
such that the takings clause applies. The bulk of this litigation in recent years
has centered around attempted federal regulation of mining activities on the
federal lands.
The Supreme Court described when a private property right in public resources suffices to trigger the protections of the Takings Clause in its 1985
United States v. Locke7 decision. The Court held that the forfeiture of valuable unpatented mining claims for sand and gravel due to the holders' failure to
comply with FLPMA's annual recordation requirement (even though the Lockes
missed the deadline by only a day) did not amount to a taking of property
rights in those claims. The recordation scheme contained reasonable regulatory
restrictions whose application did not impermissibly interfere with the Lockes'
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.' In the course of its opinion, the
Court noted the attenuated nature of private property rights in public natural
69. The Court also held that the state regulatory scheme was not preempted by the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (1994), or the General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-45 (1994). See
Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 591-93.
70. See GraniteRock, 480 U.S. at 594.
71. See id. at 604-06 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
72. See id. at 612-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 5.03[l][d][iv].
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation").
75. See 1 PNRL, supranote 1, § 4.05.
76. See id. See also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
77. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
78. See id. at 107. Cf. Jones v. United States, 121 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (annual fee requirement did
not violate procedural due process); Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549 (Fed. Cir.) (provision of Interior
Department appropriations bill resulting in abandonment of unpatented mining claim for failure to pay annual
rental fee of $100 per claim did not effect a taking), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 74 (1996).
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resources:
The power to qualify existing property rights is particularly broad with
respect to the "character" of the property rights at issue here. Although
owners of unpatented mining claims hold fully recognized possessory
interests in their claims, we have recognized that these interests are a
"unique form of property." The United States, as owner of the underlying
fee title to the public domain, maintains broad powers over the terms and
conditions upon which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired.... Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over
those interests.79

Similarly, the Court has held that an offshore oil and gas lease does not vest in
the lessee a full property interest in the minerals; thus, cancellation of the lease
8
to avoid environmental contamination would not amount to a taking.w
A series of lower court cases has addressed the issue of when a prospective miner of hardrock minerals seeking to patent its claims acquires a sufficient
property interest to invoke the takings clause."' In Freese v. United States,'
the Claims Court held in 1981 that a statute withdrawing from mineral location
a national recreation area did not effect a taking by denying the holders of
unpatented claims the ability to obtain fee title patents. "At best," the court
remarked, "plaintiff has suffered a denial of the opportunity to obtain greater
property than that which he owned upon the effective date of [the statute]. This
cannot be deemed the divestment of a property interest, save by the most overt
bootstrapping."83 In subsequent litigation, the Claims Court held that the Forest
Service did not commit a taking by regulating Freese's unpatented mining
claims because his interest was only possessory in nature and the agency's
regulation did not extinguish the essential attribute of that interest. Economically viable development of the claims was still possible."
The Freese litigation did not resolve the question of whether the filing of a
patent application and the payment of applicable fees gives rise to a compensable right to a patent. The Ninth Circuit ruled in Swanson v. Babbitt' that no
such right arises as long as the Interior Department contests the validity of the
patent application. As a result, legislation enacted during such a challenge did
not require compensation of the holder of claims made unpatentable by that
legislation.' In Cook v. United States,87 however, the Court of Federal

79. See Locke, 471 U.S. at 104-05 (citations omitted). See also Western Energy Co. v. Dep't of the
Interior, 932 F.2d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1991); Western Fuels-Utah v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (concerning regulation of coal mining).
80. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337-43 (1984). Compensation for cancellation of offshore leases is sometimes provided by statute, however. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(C) (1994);
Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. See generally Michael Graf, Application of Takings Law to the Regulation of Unpatented Mining
Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57 (1997), reprinted in 34 PUB. LAND L. DIGEST 219 (1997).
82. 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. C.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
83. Id. at 758.
84. See Freese v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 1 (1984), affd, 770 F.2d 177 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
85. 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. See id. at 1353-54. Cf. Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 761 (the BLM did
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Claims denied the government's motion for summary judgment on a taking
claim, concluding that the filing of a patent application and the payment of the
statutory purchase price vested equitable title to the land in the applicants.'
Swanson was distinguishable because the BLM in Cook never disputed the
applicants' compliance with statutory requirements. Rather, its delay in approving the patents was due to its own failure to verify the information in the application relating to the applicants' allegations of a valuable discovery.' In two
earlier cases," the government's failure to process mining claims in a timely
manner did not give rise to compensable takings, even though, in one case, the
result was loss of the claims'
A government regulatory action which appears to amount to an attempt to
force transfer of title to the government itself or to a third party is susceptible
to being characterized as a compensable taking. In United Nuclear Corp. v.
United States,9' for example, the Secretary of the Interior approved the
plaintiff's purchase of leases from the Navajo Tribe. After the plaintiff spent
millions of dollars exploring for and locating uranium deposits, the Secretary
afforded the Tribe a veto power over approval of the company's mining operations. The Tribe subsequently withheld approval, even though the mining plan
satisfied applicable federal regulations. The Federal Circuit held that the decision to vest veto power in the Tribe took the plaintiff's property. The leases
were valuable property rights, not mere expectancies, and the agency's refusal
to approve the mining plan amounted to a destruction of the company's reasonable investment-backed expectations.93 Further, the Secretary's decision was an

effort "to enable the Tribe to exact additional money from a company with
whom it had a valid contract." ' 4 The Court of Federal Claims reached a similar
result in the analogous NRG v. United States case,9 holding that a 1980 statute9 canceling coal prospecting permits so that the Secretary could negotiate
permit and lease cancellation agreements acceptable to the Cheyenne Tribe effected a taking.'

not take property of Alaska Native Village by rejecting tract selections under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act because no patent to the selected tracts had been issued), reconsiderationdenied in relevantpart,36
Fed. CL 593 (1996).
87. 37 Fed. Cl. 435 (1997).
88. See id. at 439.
89. See id. at 442-43. Cf. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 43, 49-50 (1994) (mere assertion by mineral lease applicant that it has discovered valuable deposit does not provide it with a vested property right for purposes of the takings clause). In Payne v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 709 (1994), the court
stayed an action under the Tucker Act for compensation for an alleged taking of unpatented mining and
millsite claims so that the BLM could assess the validity of the claims. See also Holden v. United States, 38
Fed. CL 732, 735-36 (1997).
90. Alaska Limestone Corp. v. Hodel, 614 F. Supp. 642 (D. Alaska 1985); Last Chance Mining Co. v.
United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 551 (1987), affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir.) (Table), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988).
91. See Last Chance Mining Co., 12 Cl. Ct. at 556-57.
92. 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
93. See id. at 1437.
94. Id. at 1438.
95. 30 Fed. Cl. 460 (1994).
96. The Cancellation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-401, 94 Stat. 1701 (1980).
97. See NRG, 30 Fed. Cl. at 465. But cf.Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (10th
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Assuming that the holder of private mineral rights in public lands is able
to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing a vested property interest, 98 the
holder is more likely to allege that a taking occurred as a result of adverse
economic impact than an attempted forced transfer of title to a third party such
as an Indian tribe. Such takings claims for the most part have not fared well. In
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt,99 for example, the Tenth Circuit

found no taking despite the adoption of new, stringent management standards
for mineral claims and leases in BLM wilderness study areas."W The Federal
Circuit in 1990 held that the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of
1978, ' °' which required costly reclamation, was not a taking."r

An applicant for permission to drill for oil and gas on BLM public lands
received a more favorable reception from the Court of Federal Claims in Bass
Enterprises Production Co. v. United States.

3

The BLM denied drilling per-

mission for a site underneath the proposed Department of Energy Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to give the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
time to determine whether drilling would comply with its disposal regulations. 4 The court found that the plaintiff suffered a serious financial loss
which rendered the lease valueless and interfered with its reasonable investment-backed expectations. Therefore, a permanent taking occurred.' On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed' °6 A permanent taking could not
have occurred because Congress required the EPA to determine whether condemnation of the leases was necessary to ensure the integrity of the WIPP facility. At most, then, the denial of the drilling permits amounted to a temporary
taking: the result of EPA's determination would be either issuance of the lease
Circuit remanded
or condemnation and compensation of the lessee. The Federal
07
occurred.
had
taking
temporary
a
whether
to determine
The Claims Court in Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. United States'0 found that

deferral of the right to use public mineral resources did not trigger taking liability,"° although the case was decided before the Supreme Court endorsed the
notion of temporary takings in the 1987 case, FirstEnglish EvangelicalLuther-

Cir. 1991) (rescission of lease on Indian land was not a taking because the lessee had no vested interest in the
property). The amount of compensation due in the NRG litigation was the subject of a later opinion. See NRG
Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 659 (1994).
98. Environmental regulation by the federal land management agencies of uses in the nature of common
law nuisances may escape designation as takings on the ground that the regulated activity was not part of the
claimant's bundle of property rights to begin with. See, e.g., M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 53 (1995).
99. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
100. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1994).
101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2022, 2113-14 (1994).
102. See Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756-58 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990).
103. 35 Fed. Cl. 615 (1996), rev'd, 133 F.3d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104. See id. at 616.
105. See id. at 620.
106. See Bass Enterprises, 133 F.3d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
107. See id. at 896-97.
108. 591 F.2d 1308 (CL Cl. 1979).
109. See id. at 1327.
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an Church v. County of Los Angeles."' Offshore oil lessees asserted that Inte-

rior Department regulation of leasehold operations worked an indefinite suspension of their operations. But the court regarded the temporary suspension of the
lessees' right to drill as insufficiently severe as to constitute a taking."' In
Eastern Minerals International,Inc. v. United States,"' on the other hand, the

Court of Federal Claims in 1997 characterized the Office of Surface Mining's
"war of attrition" on a company seeking permit to mine coal as a requisition of
its right to lease renewal." 3
The government runs the risk of incurring liability for a taking of private
property rights in public mineral resources when it attempts to transfer vested
interests from one person to another"4 or imposes regulatory restrictions in
the nature of physical invasions. It also risks incurring liability for a temporary
taking when the effect of extraordinary delays in processing applications for
patents or drilling permission is severe diminution of the value of those interests. Despite a renewed interest in the Supreme Court in extending the scope of
the protection afforded property rights by the takings clause and a resulting
reworking of the criteria for evaluating takings claims," 5 however, the courts
for the most part have not applied expanded protections in a manner which
impairs significantly regulatory authority over federal lands and resources."'

In sum, 200 years of interpretation have made the constitutional meaning
in terms of federally owned lands and resources fairly clear. Congress can do as
it wishes, including delegating broad management powers to agencies."'
Whatever it does overrides contrary state law and seldom affords interests affected a just compensation remedy.

110. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
111. See Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d at 1327.
112. 39 Fed. Cl. 621 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
113. See id. at 625.
114. Cf. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (taking resulting from conversion of
an abandoned railroad easement into a public recreational trail). Due to the proliferation of opinions in the
case, one of the dissenting judges characterized it as a decision with "no precedential value." Id. at 1555
(Clevenger, J., dissenting).
115. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
116. For nonmineral cases in which the government escaped takings liability, see e.g., Andrs v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Patera, 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d
1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d
1423 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). In a few instances, however, the courts have invalidated regulatory efforts under the takings clause. The Supreme Court twice invalidated provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994), which restricted the descent and devise of land held by
Native Americans. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S.Ct. 727 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Both
the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit have afforded a solicitous ear to property owners claiming that restrictions on development of wetlands have worked a taking. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
117. See generally United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
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III. ACQUISITION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Return again to the year 1791. The English ruled Canada; the Spanish had
settlements from St. Augustine to San Francisco; French trappers roamed the
interior river systems of the continent; and the Russians were exploring the far
northwest. Much of this foreign occupation was unknown to the Founding Fathers. They had no way of envisioning a single nation spreading from Key West
to Nome, Alaska, and from San Diego to Chicago. But, of course, all this came
to pass in less than a century. By 1867, the United States had acquired sovereignty from other nations and title from Indian tribes" 8 to well over a billion
acres of land beyond the Mississippi, not counting Texas.

9

IV. THE DisPOSMON ERA, 1789-1934

As indicated above, traditional 19th century public land law comprised the
rules and means by which the United States transferred its lands and resources
to states or private parties. Disposition was the dominant federal policy throughout the 1800s, but it was not the exclusive policy. Congress experimented with
pine tree plantations for ship masts in the South and with lead mine leasing in
the Midwest.' The experiments ended because of the fraud and perjury that
characterized so much of national settlement. Further, the legislative and executive branches routinely reserved certain lands for forts, Indian tribes, and similar
purposes.' With the reservation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 and
the beginnings of the national forest system in 1891, the Conservation Age
began to overtake the Disposition Era.
But; from ratification of the Constitution until 1934, the United States sold
or gave away over a billion acres. The main recipients were war veterans,
1
states, railroads, ranchers, miners, and, of course, the storied homesteaders. 2
For purposes of this article, the most important of these giveaways took the
form of the General Mining Law (GML) of 1872,123 whose principal purpose
was to promote mineral development. The GML gave a locator of a mining
claim the right to extract the mineral located without charge, the right to exclusive occupation of the surface of the claim, and, in many instances, the right,
virtually for free, to receive a fee simple patent to the land upon proof of discovery and assessment work.' 24 As generous as this law was, many claimants
nevertheless found ways to abuse it by staking claims for non-mineral purposes
or without having discovered valuable mineral deposits.'"

118. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
119. See COmmINS, ET AL., supra note 3, at 45-49.
120. See PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT ch. 4 (1968).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
See GATES, supra note 120, passim; COGGINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at ch. 2.
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1994).
See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 2.02[3][b].
See id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 33:765

Most details of the disposition-oriented statutes are of little concern today
because disposition, although theoretically possible in some instances, effectively is a dead letter in 1998. The Taylor Grazing Act of 19346 effectively

closed the public domain and ended the land giveaway by withdrawing the
remaining unsettled, unreserved lands into grazing districts.' For three generations, therefore, the general outlines of the present federal landed estate (except
in Alaska) have been set. Despite various efforts to reform it in recent years,
the GML remains on the books (although Congress has adopted a series of
moratoria on the issuance of hardrock mineral patents in annual Department of
28
the Interior appropriations legislation).
The legacies of even the repealed Disposition-Era legislation continue to
complicate and bedevil federal land management. One such legacy is the
cartographically chaotic land ownership map of the western states.
Checkerboarded sections,"2 the "blue rash" of state school sections,"3 isolated federal sections,' interspersed hardrock mining claims,1 2 ribbonshaped ranches along watercourses," special federal zoning categories" -all of these are highly productive of access disputes and other related
difficulties. That the federal lands are concentrated in the West, and that they
tend to be least agriculturally productive, exacerbate such problems. Another
legacy is attitudinal: engrained in all too many westerners is the notion that theworld-owes-me-a-living-because-I-am-a-better-person-than-the-rest-of-you. This
attitude and its lesser variants sometimes breed unrealistic expectations as well
as outright lawlessness."

V. THE AGE OF CONSERVATION, 1872-?
In 1872, the Disposition Era was in full swing. The Homestead Act" of
1862 offered free land to all comers; the transcontinental railroads reaped federal sections as the rails sprang forward; new states were forming and old states
received land to support A&M colleges; 37 and Congress legitimized miners'
trespasses and gave them the land overlying their claims for pittances.' But
1872, the same year in which the GML was enacted, also marked the inception
126. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994).
127. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 19.02.
128. See, eg., H.R. 2107, § 314, 105th Cong.,(1997) (enrolled bill); Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 112, 108
Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994).
129. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
130. See Melinda Bruce & Theresa Rice, Controlling the Blue Rash: Issues and Trends in State Land
Management,XXIX LAND & WATER L.REV. 1 (1994).
131. See, eg., Elizabeth Kitchens Jones, Acquiring Federaland State Land Through Exchanges, 9 Jul.UTAH B.J. 19, 20 (1996).
132. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 25.03.
133. See COwOINs, Er AL., supra note 3, at 691-93.
134. See, eg., 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1994).
135. See, eg., Glicksman, supra note 26.
136. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-164. (repealed in part 1976).
137. See, e.g., COGOINS, ET AL., supra note 3, at 78.
138. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1994).
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of a new policy. Congress in that year withdrew from availability for exploitation two million acres in northwest Wyoming as a "pleasuring ground" for the
people. 39 The reservation of Yellowstone National Park was, strictly speaking,
more of a preservational than conservational action, but it unquestionably was
the catalytic action that sparked the Age of Conservation. The onset of conservation was the beginning of the end for homesteading; it also removed certain
federal lands from areas available for private mineral exploitation.
A. ConservationReservations

Conservation as a theory and practice is an offspring of the progressive
wave that swept the country from 1888 (when the ICC was chartered) to World
War I. The word itself was coined by Gifford Pinchot, the first Forest Service
chief, and it meant basically retaining lands in federal ownership and managing
them in such a fashion as to obtain the most material benefits for the most
people in the long run. Science would guide this form of utilitarianism. 40
Congress, in fits and starts, generally concurred. In 1891, Congress authorized the President to set aside lands as forest reserves,'4' and, in 1897, it
specified that these lands were to be used as timber and water storehouses. 42
Congress later decided that Presidents had been overly liberal with this withdrawal authority and repealed the authorization, but not before the 190-million
acre national forest system had become a lasting reality.'43 Congress also created a number of new national parks in this era, and, in 1916, formally designated these areas as the national park system, to be managed by the National
Park Service.' 44 Except for claims that predate withdrawal and reservation, most
mining activity was barred in the national parks, and preexisting claims are
subject to invalidation for failure to record." Congress also enhanced the
park system in 1906 by empowering the President to set aside lands containing
features of scientific or archaeological interest as national monuments to be
included in the park system.'4
Another manifestation of the Conservation Age was creation of the national wildlife refuge system. Presidents, by unilateral actions, began reserving
lands for wildlife habitat, and Congress added areas for similar purposes at odd
intervals during the 20th century. 47 The various wildlife areas were consolidated into a system in 1966'" and now comprise about 90 million acres,

139. See 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
140. See, e.g., STEWART T. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 97-108 (1963).
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976).
142. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (partially repealed 1976) (1994).
143. See, eg., James Huffman, A History of ForestPolicy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1978).
144. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
145. See The Mining in Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1907 (1994).
146. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
147. See generally Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18
HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1 (1994).
148. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1994).
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much of which is in Alaska."4 Congress gave the FWS new organic authority
in 1997."o Under that authority, commodity production, including mining activity, is subordinate to the priority uses of the national wildlife refuge system,
wildlife-dependent recreational uses.'
Early in this century, therefore, three of the primary conservation land
systems had been more or less firmly established. That trend would climax in
1934, when Congress gave up on homesteading and authorized withdrawal of
the remaining unclaimed, unreserved lands into grazing districts. Since 1934,
nearly all federal lands outside Alaska have been designated for retention and
conservation-type or preservation-type management.
Congress for a century concurred in executive withdrawals and itself reserved millions of acres for conservation and preservation, but Congress then as
now was loath to spell out specific or precise standards for managing the reserved lands. And, when limits were specified in the law, they often were honored mostly in the breach. The 1897 Forest Service Organic Act, for instance,
commanded that only selective timber cutting could be allowed in national
forests, 5 2 but otherwise it merely gave the Forest Service the most general
guidance or limitations. The clearcutting prohibition was uniformly ignored by
agency and industry after World War II until a court shut down the practice in
19752"3 The multiple use mandate governing formulation of the land use
plans designed to control management of the national forests omits reference to
minerals,' but the Forest Service has broad discretion to allow and regus mining-related activity'
late'55
The National Park Service Organic Act set out somewhat more specific
reservation purposes but gave the NPS wide discretion to achieve those
preservational/recreational purposes.' 7 The agency responsible for wildlife refuges (which had various names until 1966) had no general statutory authority;
its operations were governed by individual refuge laws, executive orders, and
tradition.'5 8 The Reclamation Act of 1902" 9 set limits on who could receive
subsidized water and under what conditions,"6 but the irrigators evaded the
limits while the Bureau of Reclamation looked the other way for decades.' 6'
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the product of a 1946 merger of the
Land Office and the Grazing Service, was from its inception a standardless

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
(1989).

See Fink supra note 147, at 5.
See National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252.
See id. § 5(a) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3)(C)).
See 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 1976).
See West Virginia Div., Izaac Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (1994).
See, e.g., Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995).
See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 7, §§ 16.01-16.02.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
See, e.g., Schwenke v. Secretary of the Interior, 720 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1983).
See 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 21B.03.
See, e.g., Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGs L. J. 657
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cipher of the livestock and mining industries.' Not until the 1970s did the
BLM, with new statutory powers, try to become a true conservation agency-a
venture that died upon the ascension of Secretary James Watt in 1981.163
Another aspect of the progressive/conservation period of 1890-1916 was a
degree of judicial activism not seen before or since in federal public land law.
"
The highlight decisions were Buford,164 Camfield,1 Illinois Central,1171
61 Winters,69 Light," and Midwest Oil.
Colorado,
v.
Geer," Kansas
These decisions are now fundamental parts of the law. The Buford Court, building on a mining law precedent, held that all citizens have a license to graze
their livestock on the public lands. The license was implicitly created by
Congress' knowledge of existing trespasses and its disinclination to do anything
about them.'7 Camfield in 1897 and Light in 1911 confirmed that congressional Property Clause power is plenary, unlimited, and preemptive."' Geer in
1896 and Illinois Central in 1892 concerned the validity of state resources law.
In Geer, the Court carved out an exemption from Commerce Clause prohibitions against resource-hoarding by states; Connecticut, said the Court, could
forbid export of wild game because, as the owner of wildlife, the state could
prevent commerce from even starting. 74 Geer was premised on one aspect of

a public trust notion, and Illinois Centraltook that doctrine into another dimension. By virtue of the public trust/equal footing doctrine of Pollard,Illinois, at
statehood, became the owner of the lands underlying Chicago's harbor. The
Illinois Legislature, perhaps with improper incentives, decided to transfer the
harbor to a railroad, Illinois later changed its mind, and the controversy over
ownership ended up in the United States Supreme Court. The Court drew on a
new and expanded version of the public trust doctrine to hold that Illinois as
trustee could not divest itself of an area so important to the people for navigation, commerce, and fishing.'75 In both cases, conservation of public resources
was a central motif.
In Kansas v. Colorado and Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court
invented new forms of property entitlements, both now standard aspects of

162. See PHILLIP 0. FOSS, POLIcs AND GRASS (1960).
163. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of PublicRangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and
the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983).
164. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
165. Canifleld v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
166. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
167. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
168. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
169. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
170. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
171. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
172. See Buford, 133 U.S. at 322-23. Miners, however, do not have unlimited access rights across federal
lands, see, e.g., Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995); Utah v.
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979); Bob Strickler, 106 IBLA 1 (1988), despite arguments by industry
to the contrary. See 2 PNLR, supra note 1, § 10E.01[3][c].
173. See I PNRL, supra note 1, § 3.03[3].
174. See Geer, 161 U.S. at 532. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 8.0212][a].
175. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 8.07.
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public natural resources law. 76 The Kansas Court arrogated unto itself the
power to allocate interstate streams between states.'" The doctrine of equitable apportionment concedes primacy to Congress, but judicially operates to
determine property rights in water when, as usual, Congress fails to act.'" The
Winters doctrine created extensive water rights in the United States. The Court
held that when the government reserved land for an Indian reservation, it implicitly reserved sufficient unappropriated water to serve the purpose of the
reservation." 9 That holding was later extended to all federal reservations.' °
Like Kansas v. Colorado, conservation impelled the judicial invention.
Midwest Oil'8' in 1915 also was a triumph of progressive conservationism. President Taft in 1909 withdrew millions of acres from mining availability
to protect federal petroleum reserves. He had no statutory warrant for doing so,
although Congress gave him such authority the following year.'82 The oil
company defendant drilled and produced oil from a withdrawn tract, and the
United States sued. The Court upheld the withdrawal. It did not decide whether
the President had inherent authority to do it,'83 but held instead that Congress,
knowing of the practices of prior presidents in withdrawing lands for military,
Indian, and bird reservations, created the power by acquiescing in its exercise.'84 Thus, the same rather circular logic used to create rights in trespassing
miners and grazers was extended to creation of executive powers necessary to
safeguard the public interest.
C. Dormancy
The last (perhaps posthumous) gasp of the progressive conservation era
was enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act in 1920.' This law removed coal,
oil, gas, oil shale, and four chemical minerals from the location system and
provided that they henceforth could be obtained only by leasing.'" Leasing
affords the government far more control over the pace and degree of development on the federal land than the long-unregulated location mechanisms.'
The Supreme Court has often affirmed the Interior Secretary's broad discretion
to decide whether or not to grant mineral leases. 8

176. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 113-14; Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-77.
177. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 113-14. See TARLOCK, supra note 10, at ch. 10.
178. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 95-98.
179. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-77.
180. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595, 597-98, 601 (1963); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435,
444-45, 452 (1955).
181. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
182. See Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-142 (§141 repealed 1976).
183. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 469.
184. See id. at 471-75. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 3.04.
185. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994).
186. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, at chs. 22-24A.
187. See, e.g., COGGINS, ET AL., supra note 3, at ch. 6 § B.
188. See, e.g., Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S. 989 (1965); Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963); Chapman
v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950); United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S.
414 (1931).
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The period from the First World War until 1964 was quiescent in public
land law terms, at least as compared to the progressive era that preceded it. The
Teapot Dome scandal led to considerable Interior Department caution in leasing
petroleum resources, and the Depression effectively destroyed the oil and gas
markets. The 1920s saw some land reacquisition initiatives" 9 but few noteworthy developments. The New Deal of the 1930s transformed the nature of the
federal government, but little progress in federal land law occurred because the
economic problems overshadowed conservation policies. World War II and its
aftermath dominated the decade of the 1940s; conservation was not a prominent
national concern.
Some seeds of the Preservation Age were sown in the 1950s. Sentiment for
wilderness designation was fueled by the Wilderness Society, whose chief,
Howard Zalmizer, enlisted Senator Humphrey of Minnesota in the cause.' 9'
Pollution problems were exacerbated by boom times in some areas, notably Los
Angeles. Social issues, especially segregation, took on new prominence. Development, exemplified by the national defense highway system and dams across
the country, was the national priority. But a backlash was brewing.
VI. THE MODERN AGE OF PRESERVATION

The onset of the Age of Preservation may be traced to the Wilderness Act
of 1964."' It was a truly radical departure, one that could only have come
about through the legislative wizardry of President Johnson and Senators
Humphrey and Jackson.
A. 1964

Consider the situation on the federal lands in 1964. The BLM was a legislative bastard: it had a low budget, less public esteem, no organic statutory
authority, and responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of hundreds, if not thousands, of pieces of congressional flotsam. The Forest Service
increasingly was jettisoning its traditional custodial role for more activist lumber production. Recreational use of the federal lands was climbing almost exponentially as prosperity gave Americans more leisure time. The Park and Wildlife Refuge Systems continued to grow in acreage, but not in corresponding
financial resources.
The federal land laws in 1964 were heavily tilted toward resource development and exploration. Homesteading was but a minor concern, although many
of the 19th and early 20th century homesteading laws were still on the
books."9I The major operative statutes were the General Mining Law of

189. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 718-718h (1994).
190. See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d ed. 1982).

191. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
192. See, e.g., Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp. 821 (D. Nev. 1965).
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1872,93 the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897,'9' the Reclamation Act of
1902,"9 the Antiquities Act of 1906,196 the Pickett Act of 1910,"97 the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,'" the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,9 and the
Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.0 Also in the statutory mix was a
nascent federal wildlife law in the form of the Lacey Act of 1900,'1 the Mi-

gratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,=. habitat acquisition laws, 23 the Bald
Eagle Protection Act of 1940,204 and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
of 1934 .205 Federal water law, such as it was, was embodied in the Federal
Power Act of 19200 and various sketchy Supreme Court doctrines. 7 Alaska, made a state only five years before, was subject to various special laws, including statehood land selections.2os
In 1964, mining was widely thought to be the highest and best use of the
federal lands. Oil companies, fearing declining petroleum reserves, were acquiring vast federal coal leases at little cost and with no developmental responsibilities.2° Oil shale interest waxed and waned. Offshore oil production and exploration rose dramatically. The "simo" lottery for onshore federal oil and gas
leases had not yet experienced the fraud and abuse which would cause its demise a generation later.21 Clearcutting was replacing selective cutting as the
harvest method of choice in the national forests and on the 0 & C lands.21'
Recreation as a resource had been recognized by Congress in several statutes,21 but it remained a legal stepchild.
The most notable difference between 1964 and preceding years was the
political climate. John Kennedy's death in 1963 was a strong impelling factor
for the wave of Great Society legislation during the rest of the decade. In public
land law, the Wilderness Act of 1964 was the critical departure.

193. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-45 (1994).
194. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-485 (1994).
195. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1994).
196. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
197. 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-142 (1994).
198. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994).
199. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315m (1994).
200. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
201. 16 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
202. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1994).
203. 16 U.S.C. §§ 718-718h (1994).
204. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994).
205. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1994).
206. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1994).
207. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
208. See Joseph Rudd, Who Owns Alaska? - MineralRights Acquisition Amid Rapidly Changing Land
Ownership, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 109 (1975).
209. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977).
210. See, e.g., Thomas A. Sansonetti & William R. Murray, A Primer on the FOOGLRA of 1987 and Its
Regulations, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 375 (1990).

211. See, e.g., West Virginia Div., Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
212. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
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B. 1960s Legislation

The Wilderness Act, itself a compromise of sorts," 3 was a part of a legislative package which included the Classification and Multiple Use Act (CMUA)
of 1964214 and the law establishing the Public Land Law Review Commission
(PLLRC).2 The Wilderness Act provided prospectors and prospective lessees
with a twenty-year window of opportunity in which to locate claims or obtain
leases, 2 16 but few hardrock claims were located during that period21 7 and, effective January 1, 1984, wilderness areas were withdrawn from new mineral
location and leasing.2 8 The CMUA directed the BLM to inventory the lands
under its jurisdiction and classify them for their appropriate uses.219 Before the
BLM classified or the PLLRC reported, however, Congress embarked on a
series of initiatives that foreshadowed the deluge of legislation in the 1970s.
In 1965, Congress passed the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act,20
which funded and authorized federal and state purchases of land for public
recreation. The following year saw the first federal endangered species legislation, a toothless but nevertheless innovative venture.22' At the same time, Congress consolidated the wildlife refuges into a management systemtm Then,
proceeding from the example of the Buffalo National River, "3 Congress in
1968 set in motion procedures for designating national wild and scenic rivers24 (in the process, withdrawing from hardrock mineral location all minerals
within a quarter mile of the banks of a designated river221 and subjecting mineral leasing to regulation necessary to prevent pollution and unnecessary scenic
impairment) "6 and national trailsF (in legislation authorizing the federal
land management agencies to issue protective regulations). " The first significant federal pollution statutes became law during this period. " 9 Capping the
decade, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
December, 1969.m These environmental protection statutes would have a significant limiting effect on the ability to explore for and produce minerals on the
213. See 2 PNRL, supranote 1, § 14B.04.
214. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970).
215. Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982.
216. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1994).
217. See 2 PNRL, supranote 1, § 14B.04[6].
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1994). This prohibition was subject to "valid rights then existing." Id.
See generally Kathryn Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31
(1985).
219. See National wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 497
U.S. 871 (1990).
220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1994).
221. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed in 1973).
222. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1994).
223. 16 U.S.C. § 460m-8 to 460m-14 (1994).
224. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
225. See 16 U.S.C. § 1280(a)(iii) (1994).
226. See id. § 1280(a)(i).
227. See id. §§ 1241-1251 (1994).
228. See id. § 1246(i).
229. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392.
230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
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federal lands.
C. The Public Land Law Review Commission Report
The PLLRC reported in 1970, soon after enactment of NEPA." Many
claimed at the time (April 1970 saw the first Earth Day, remember) that the
PLLRC Report was obsolete before it was released because it failed to take
sufficient account of the environmental enthusiasm then prominent.232 Whether
or not those criticisms were fair or accurate, Congress never adopted the recommendations of the Committee bodily. Many recommendations, however,
were partially enacted in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) of 1976.23

The most basic PLLRC recommendation was for congressionally determined dominant uses of the federal tracts.2 Congress, however, instead extended the Forest Service's authority to manage for multiple use (including
mineral production)2 and sustained yield to the BLM. Congress in 1976
also explicitly stated its intention to retain the BLM public lands in federal
ownership, somewhat contrary to the PLLRC conclusions.2 In many respects,
the PLLRC Report was overwhelmed and superseded by the legislative, administrative, and judicial developments of the 1970s.
D. Legislation of the 1970s
Congress in the 1970s laid the basic foundations for modem public resources law. With hindsight, the legislative efforts can be sorted into somewhat
discrete categories: pollution laws; wildlife laws; energy laws; and land management laws.
1. Federal Pollution Laws
In the spate of legislation between the Clean Air Act of 197023' and the
Superfund law3 9 of 1980, Congress established a variety of expensive, complicated mechanisms for combating the various forms of pollution. The primary
federal enforcer was and is the Environmental Protection Agency, created by
executive order in 1970.m The Clean Air Act demanded the issuance of na231. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970) [hereinafter cited
as PLLRC].
232. See, e.g., Donald M. Carmichael, An EnvironmentalistLooks at the PLLRC Report, 6 LAND & WATER L. REv. 319 (1970).
233. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994). See Charles F. Wilkinson, The National Forest Management Act:
The Twenty Years Behind, The Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 665-66 (1997).
234. See PLRRC, supra note 231.
235. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1994).
236. See id. § 1732(a).

237. See id. § 1701(a)(1).
238.
239.
Pub. L.
240.

Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994)).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980,
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
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tional ambient air quality standards24 ' and hazardous air pollutant
standards ' and allowed the states to achieve the desired levels of air quality

with, for the most part, 43 whatever means they chose.2 " Some of the resulting regulations applied directly to mining and related activities! 41 The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972246 went further by setting

zero pollution goals

and requiring all pollution point sources to obtain per-

mits from federal agencies or from state agencies overseen by EPA.24 The

mining industry has been affected by effluent limitations applicable to aspects
of mining characterized as point sourcesF4 as well as by the application of
best management practices to nonpoint source activity.-"0 Both the Forest Service and the BLM, for example, require those engaged in hardrock mining or
oil and gas leasing to comply with state water quality standards promulgated

under the Clean Water Act.25' Congress adopted similar legislation to constrain marine dumping, 2 noise pollution. 3 groundwater contamination, 4
and solid waste disposalF 5 between 1972 to 1976. The persistent efforts of the
241. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994).
242. See id. § 7412.
243. The amendments to the statute adopted in 1977 and 1990 constrained the discretion of those states
which had not yet succeeded in achieving the national standards by dictating that they impose more stringent
controls on certain kinds of sources. See id. §§ 7501-7515.
244. See id. § 7410.
245. See, e.g., National Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that EPA was
authorized to include fugitive emissions of hazardous air pollutants in determining whether a plant's emissions
are sufficient to subject it to regulation as a major source).
246. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)). The
FWPCA is today referred to as the Clean Water Act.
247. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
248. See id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a).
249. See, e.g., Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979); Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983,
987-89 (E.D. Wash. 1994). Cf. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding
regulations requiring permits for contaminated stormwater discharges from inactive mining operations).
250. In Kelso v. Rybachek, 912 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1996), a group of miners failed in their attempt to overturn the state's denial of a petition to reclassify streams to exclude all water use except industrial use. The use
designation of a particular body of water dictates the water quality standards and maximum daily pollutant
loads attached to that body of water. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)-(d) (1994). Cf. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown
Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995) (distinguishing point from nonpoint sources). See
generally Henry W. Ipsen, Water Quality Management Plans and Their Impact on Mining Operations, 23
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 551 (1977); Richard Whitman, Clean Water or Multiple Use? Best Management
Practicesfor Water Quality Control in the NationalForests, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 909 (1985).
251. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802.3-2(b), 3809.2-2(b) (1997); 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.8(b), 228.112(c)(2) (1997).
252. See The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat.
1052 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1994)).
253. See The Noise Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4901-4918 (1994)).
254. There is no single "groundwater protection act" similar to the statutes governing air and surface
water pollution. Rather, Congress has adopted a host of statutes whose aims include the protection of groundwater resources. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Groundwater Pollution I.
The Problem and the Law, 35 KAN. L. REV. 75, 90-140 (1986). One of the most significant of these statutes
is the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f300j-21 (1994), as amerided by Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1615 (1996)), which authorized EPA to establish standards for public water systems supplying drinking water, created an injection control program to
protect underground sources of drinking water, and provided financial incentives to prevent the contamination
of sole source aquifers and wellhead areas.
255. See The Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 StaL 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994)).
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mining industry to narrow the definition of solid waste under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (also known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, or
RCRA) is indicative of the perceived burdens imposed on the industry by
the controls authorized by that statute. Congress did, however, sustain President
Ford's veto of Senator Henry Jackson's national land use control bill.s 7
The Carter Administration was concerned more with energy policy than
pollution control, but two notable statutes emerged in the Carter years. As a
result, by the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, all of the current
pollution control systems were in place. All of those laws would be amended in
future years but all have endured in their main outlines. The first of the two
Carter era additions was the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) of 1977, 25 which sought to establish a national program "to protect
society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining
operations." ' SMCRA established systems of coal mining and reclamation
standards far more rigorous than anything before it had done. It has great relevance to federal land law because billions of tons of strippable coal underlie
federal holdings in the West." ° Among other things, SMCRA requires the
Interior Secretary to designate areas unsuitable for surface mining activity. 2'
The statute itself places areas such as units of the national park, wildlife refuge,
trails, wilderness preservation, and wild and scenic rivers systems off-limits to
mining, subject to valid existing rights."s Surface mining within the national
forests is also restricted, unless the Interior Secretary finds that mining would
not be incompatible with significant recreational, timber, economic, or other
values."s In Utah International, Inc. v. Department of the Interior,2" the
court held that the unsuitability provision did not result in a taking because the
lessee had not obtained permission to mine and could remove its coal by methods other than surface mining in any event.ss Even where mining is permitted

256. See, eg., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991); American Mining Congress v. EPA,
907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990), appeal
after remand, Steel Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 27 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1994); American Mining Congress v. EPA,
824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress included within RCRA, however, a series of exemptions for various mining, mineral processing, and oil and gas wastes. See generally 2 PNRL, supra note 1, at
§ 11B.05[1][d].
257. See generally Marc R. Poirier, EnvironmentalJustice and The Beach Access Movements ofthe 1970s
in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Propertyand Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 749-50 (1996).
258. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994)),
259. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1994).
260. See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 22.04.
261. See 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (1994).
262. See id. § 1272(e)(1). See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 620 F. Supp. 1519
(D.D.C. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
263. See 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2) (1994). See Ramex Mining Corp. v. Watt, 753 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 900 (1985) (declaring this provision applicable to private mineral estates within national
forests).
264. 553 F. Supp. 872 (D. Utah 1982).
265. See id. at 879. But compare The Steams Co. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264 (1995) (takings claim
filed by company required to establish valid existing rights before it could conduct surface mining was ripe
for review).
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on the federal lands, operations must procure permits'
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and abide by regula-

tions issued by the Office of Surface Mining or authorized state agencies.'

The second Carter administration addition, adopted in 1980 in response to
Love Canal and similar problems, was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

This "Superfund" law

not only authorized EPA to conduct or oversee the remediation of hazardous
substance releases;

269

it also imposed strict liability on all who contributed to

such releases for both regulting response costs and damage to natural
resources.27 CERCLA excludes petroleum products from the definition of a
hazardous substance,27' thereby affording petroleum exploration activities sig-

nificant relief from response cost liability

2

The statute does not contain a

similar exclusion for mining wastes, however, even if they are not currently

subject to regulation as hazardous wastes under RCRAY 3 Accordingly, the
courts have concluded that cobalt, copper,

wastes,

5

4

asbestos mining and milling

and uranium mine tailingsve all are hazardous substances whose

release may give rise to response cost liability under CERCLA.

The effect of the federal pollution control laws on federal land use is difficult to summarize.2

Agricultural uses, including grazing and silviculture,

have not been heavily influenced by pollution statutes because of relatively lenient statutory treatment (i.e., weak or nonexistent controls for logging and
farming)"5 attributable to the strength of agricultural lobbyists and a congres-

sional reluctance to establish federal land use controls. Oil and gas operations
and hardrock mines, however, have had to live with strict new regulatory re-

gimes whenever they use or encounter brines,2' leachate, runoffw or haz266. See 30 C.F.R. § 740.13(a)(2) (1997).
267. See 30 C.F.L § 740.
268. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
269. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).
270. See id. § 9607(a).
271. See id. § 9601(14).
272. The applicability of the exclusion to liability for natural resource damages is not as clear. See Gregory G. Garre, Note, Environmental Law: CERCLA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C.
Circuit's Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations Under Chevron, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 935-36
n.26 (1990) (arguing that the exclusion does not apply in that context).
273. See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO Inc., 24 F.3d 1565 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1103 (1995).
274. See Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987), affd, 882 F.2d 392 (9th
Cir. 1989).
75. See United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Ariz. 1984).
276. See United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552 (D.N.M. 1992). See also Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D). Colo. 1989), modified, 735 F. Supp. 368 (D. Colo.), rev'd on
other grounds, 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991) (releases from tailings
piles); T&E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, (D.NJ. 1988) (camotite ore tailings).
277. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands IV: Liability for Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 233 (1994); Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal
Lands III: Regulation of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STANFORD ENVrL. L.J. 3 (1994); Robert L Glicksman, Pollution on the FederalLands 11. Water Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
61 (1993); Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the FederalLands I: Air Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 1 (1993).
278. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1994).
279. See, eg., 43 C.F.R. § 3594.5(b) (1997); 36 C.F.R. § 9.45 (1997).
280. See, e.g., Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (D. Mont. 1995).
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The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,2 a response to the

Exxon Valdez disaster, completes the circle for oil producers; it, too, imposes
strict liability for hydrocarbon spills.8 3
In some cases, the federal pollution laws have dictated public land use
standards. In the G-O Road case," for instance, roadbuilding and timber cutting in a national forest were enjoined because the activities would violate water
quality standards.' Similarly, a court in 1996 commanded the BLM to ensure
2
compliance with pollution requirements before renewing grazing permits. 1
FLPMA provides that BLM land use plans must insure compliance with all
state and federal pollution standards.

7

Mining both on and off the federal

lands has become a more costly proposition because of the federal pollution
control laws, and, as a result of statutes such as the SMCRA, mining activities
are forbidden altogether on portions of the federal lands.
2. Federal Wildlife Laws

In 1970, federal involvement in wildlife regulation largely was an afterthought. The Lacey Act of

19 0 0

s backstopped state efforts to control poach-

ing.89 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 19182 set up a nationwide quota
system for waterfowl hunting and banned the killing or capture of other migratory birds without federal permission, but the system depended on the cooperation and enforcement efforts of the states.29' Some obscure federal statutes

authorized purchase of bird habitat areas' and others required consultation
when water projects would destroy habitat.2 The bald eagle was separately
protected, theoretically, as the national symbol by a 1940 act.294 Still, much
sentiment in the "fish and game" communities regarded federal intervention into

wildlife regulation as unwarranted if not unconstitutional.2 5
Congress disagreed. A series of federal statutes enacted between 1971 and
1976 essentially federalized much of American wildlife law. Wild horses and

burros technically are feral, not wild, but Congress, in the Wild, Free-Roaming
281. See generally Elizabeth H. Temkin & Kristin Tita, Multiparty Issues: CERCLA Mining and Energy
Sites, 35 ROcKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 6-1 (1989).
282. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994)).
283. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(17), 2702, 2706 (1994). See generally 2 PNRL, supra note 1, § 11A.05[4].
284. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Petersen, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
285. See Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 690-91, 697.
286. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996).
287. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(8) (1994).
288. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378 (1994).
289. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.02[3] n.29; Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier
Weapon in the FightAgainst Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27 (1995).
290. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1994).
291. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the
MBTA, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165 (1979).
292. See 16 U.S.C. § 718 (1994).
293. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668 (1994).
294. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994).
295. See George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55
U. WASH. L. REV. 295 (1980).
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Horses and Burros Act (WF-RHBA) of 197 129 gave them full protection from
killing and harassment when on or near national forests or BLM public
lands. This law is of most concern to ranchers who abut or use federal
lands because the equines compete with the bovines and ovines for scarce
forage. 8 Wild horse populations have grown considerably since 1970, but the
BLM actively removes "excess" horses from the range when their competition
with cows is too successful.'
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972,o engendered by
public outrage over the slaughter of dolphins in tuna harvests and of baby seals
for fur, placed a moratorium on further killing of whales, porpoises, sea otters,
seals, polar bears, manatees, walruses, sea elephants, and other air-breathing,
sea-dwelling creatures. 0 ' The effect of the MMPA on federal land law is minimal, but it does restrict many activities on the federal (and state) offshore submerged lands.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973' is the most significant
wildlife law ever enacted anywhere. Its scope is worldwide: any species of
animal (or plant) can be listed as endangered or threatened wherever found, in
all or parts of it range.30 3 Section 7 of the ESA is drafted without qualifying
language. Every federal agency must insure that its actions do not jeopardize a
listed species or destroy its habitat"0 4 This command, to be carried out
through extensive and intricate procedures, has turned out to be one of the most
stringent land use restrictions in American law. It is buttressed by the section 9
prohibition against taking (harming or harassing or killing) listed species, a ban
that extends to habitat destruction on nonfederal lands. 5
Application of the ESA has affected all facets of federal land and resources
law. The Supreme Court in the Snail Darter' case set the tone: the Act is to
be interpreted literally, and, because Congress deemed wildlife species to be of
"incalculable" worth, the costs of preserving the species cannot be weighed in
the balance." In the ensuing 20 years, courts have enjoined timber harvests," water diversions,'
water developments,3"' roads,3" ' mining
296. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
297. See id. § 1333(b). See also 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.04[3][a].
298. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951
(1987).
299. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.0413][b].
300. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994).
301. See id. § 1371.
302. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994).
303. See id. § 1533. See also 2 PNRL, supranote 1, § 15C.02[1].
304. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
305. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C).
306. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
307. See id. at 194.
308. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754
(9th Cir. 1985).
309. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
310. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
311. Cf. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's injunction against
road construction on BLM land).
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operations,312 and many other projects313 at the behest of those asserting the
rights of species to survive.
A recurring question has been the manner in which the land management
agencies must comply with the ESA's consultation requirements when they
authorize activities such as mineral leasing through a series of decisions. In
North Slope Borough v. Andrus," 4 for example, the D.C. Circuit refused to
halt the sale of offshore oil and gas leases due to the alleged inadequacy of
consideration of the impact on endangered whales. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act's"5 segmentation of the leasing process precluded the agency from
committing at the leasing stage to authorization of exploration and production.
Evaluation of the consequences of those activities on listed species at the time
the lessee submitted more concrete proposals for lease development therefore
317
would suffice.316 Similarly, in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson,
the court endorsed the approval by the Forest Service and the FWS of a
hardrock mineral prospecting plan in an area inhabited by threatened grizzly
bears, provided the prospectors complied with a series of mitigation conditions.
In Conner v. Burford,"' on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit refused to analogize onshore oil and gas leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act to the segmented process applicable to offshore leasing. The court required the Forest Service
to include in a lease a prohibition on substantial development pending issuance
of an adequate biological opinion.3" 9 FWS regulations essentially codify that

approach." °
Congress enacted two more major wildlife statutes in the 1970s. The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of

1976 32'

asserted federal regulatory

power over living marine creatures out to 200 miles offshore. The Act contemplates a quota system for taking marine fish somewhat reminiscent of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act system. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980 provided a special exemption for rural Alaskans who depend on wildlife for subsistence needs. 3
Thus, by 1980, the federal government was heavily involved in wildlife

312. See, e.g., Idaho Rivers United v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 1995 WL 877502 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 9, 1995) (requiting reinitiation of consultation with the FWS in connection with gold mining project).
Cf. Baker v. United States Dep't of Agric. 928 F. Supp. 1513 (D. Idaho 1996) (concluding that the ESA applies to the Forest Service's evaluation of a proposed plan of operations for placer mining in a national forest
but that the agency acted arbitrarily in withdrawing approval of the plan).
313. See generally 2 PNRL, supra note 1, at ch. 15C.
314. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
315. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1994).
316. See North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 607-10. See also Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605
(9th Cir. 1984). Cf. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (confuiming the segmentation
approach to offshore leasing).
317. 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
318. 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
319. See id. at 1455.

320. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(k) (1996).
321. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1822 (1994).
322. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994).
323. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.03[6].
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regulation and protection, although the federal laws constituted a patchwork of
coverage and remedies. The MBTA, WF-RHBA, and, especially, the ESA are
now integral parts of federal land law, with the last of the three having the
greatest potential to affect mineral location and leasing on the federal lands.
3. Federal Energy Laws
The spate of energy-related statutes adopted during the 1970s has but
tangential relevance to the federal lands. To the extent these laws aimed at
encouraging the development of less environmentally destructive forms of energy and at reducing dependence on foreign energy sources, however, they may
have created incentives to engage, both on and off the federal lands, in a greater
degree of certain forms of mineral exploration and production activities, such as
alternative forms of energy, and a lesser degree of other forms. 24
The impetus for most of these laws was the Arab oil embargo that caused
supply shortages and rising petroleum product prices early in the decade. The
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973325 provided the federal government with the authority to allocate crude oil and petroleum products and the
Federal Energy Administration Act, created in 1 9 7 4 ,326 was vested with the
power to impose maximum price controls. The Geothermal Energy Research,
Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974 27 sought to promote the development of this form of renewable energy as a hedge against future foreign
crude oil supply shortages. The Geothermal Steam Act of 19 7 0 as had already
authorized the Interior Secretary to lease geothermal steam and associated resources through a competitive leasing system similar to the one later established
for oil and gas under the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of
1987. 329 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act,'s ° enacted in 1975, sought
to further independence from foreign supplies by encouraging coal production,
restricting exports of energy products, and creating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

331

The pace of enactment of energy-related legislation accelerated during the
Carter Administration. The Department of Energy Organization Act of

324. Tax and other incentives meant to spur the development of nontraditional forms of energy may have
induced investments in exploration for and development of those forms of energy instead of for oil or natural
gas, for example.
325. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 754 (1982) (expired on September 30,
1981 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 760(g)).
326. Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-790h (1994)).
327. Pub. L. No. 93-410, 88 Stat. 1079 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.(1974)).
328. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1994).
329. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified primarily at 30 U.S.C. §§ 188, 195, 226). See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 24.02[2][a].
330. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32, 901-32, 919
(1994)).
331. See ENVTL. L. INST., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 457 (CampbellMohn, et al. eds., 1993). The 1975 law also required the Secretary of Transportation to set corporate average
fuel economy standards for automobile manufacturers. The ELI book contains more complete descriptions of
all of the energy-related legislation summarized in this section. See id. at 454-63.
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1977,"3 which established the Department as a cabinet-level agency, symbolized the Administration's commitment to achieving energy self-sufficiency. The
centerpiece of the substantive energy legislation adopted in the late 1970s was
the National Energy Act, which included measures aimed at conserving energy
use in buildings,333 reducing the use of oil and natural gas as boiler fuels,334

phasing out price controls for natural gas, 3 and using the tax code to promote efficient energy use." The last component of this package was the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 31 which, among other things, promoted generation of electricity by small hydropower projects and other alternative sources of energy and encouraged competition in the supply of electricity
by facilitating wheeling and power pooling.
Congress passed another major package of energy legislation two years
later. The Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 19803' not only sought to recapture some oil company profits attributable to the decade-long run-up of prices;
it also provided tax relief to developers of energy from alternative sources. The
Energy Security Act of 1980 included the Geothermal Energy Act of 1980,"39
which made federal loans available for geothermal exploration. The 1980 legislation also attempted to spur the development of fuels derived from biomass
and alcohol,' of solar energy,"' and of synthetic fuels extracted from coal,
shale, and tar sands. 342 The goal of still other legislation was to prompt the
development of thermal energy from the ocean" and of energy from
wind.3 "
Finally, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act of 1980,3

also known as the Northwest Power Act, established mecha-

nisms for allocating hydroelectric power generated on the Columbia River System and placed fish and wildlife protection concerns on a par with power production.' The Act authorized the formation of a policynaking and planning

332. Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7381 (1994)).
333. See The National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206.
334. See The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289.
335. See The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350.
336. See The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
337. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1988)).
338. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229.
339. Pub. L. No. 96-294, tit. VI, 94 Stat.763 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1542 (1994)).
340. See The Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 683.
341. See The Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-294, tit. V, 94 Stat.
719.
342. See The United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-294.
343. See The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-310, 94 Stat. 941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9009 (1994)).
344. See The Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-345, 94 Stat. 1139 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9201-9213 (1994)).
345. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994)). See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage:Prologue to the PacificNorthwest Electric Power
Planningand Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REv. 175 (1983); Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon:
A History of FailureandA Dubious Future,28 IDAHO L. REV. 667 (1991-92).
346. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1985),
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body called the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning
Council charged with the responsibility of developing a program for regional
conservation and power production to be jointly implemented by the Bonneville
Power Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 347 Environmental groups
quickly reacted to the adoption of the Northwest Power Act by resorting to it as
a means, along with the ESA, of protecting vulnerable species of anadromous
fish in the Columbia Basin.3
While novel and theretofore uneconomic forms of energy production were
most definitely favored during the 1970s, another form of energy, nuclear power, became the black sheep of the energy source family. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974e° abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and divided
up its responsibilities between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which took
over regulatory functions, and the Energy Research and Development Administration. The atomic energy industry reached a dead end in the 1980s, effectively
shutting down uranium exploration and development on the western public
lands.
4. Federal Land Management Laws
Two of the most important federal laws enacted in the 1970s outpouring of
environmental/conservation/preservation legislation were FLPMA 0 and the
NFMA,5 both passed in 1976. Other significant land management laws adopted
during this period included the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970,352 the SMCRA
of 1977, 5 the Resources Planning Act of 1974, s the Federal Coal Leasing
Act Amendments of 197 6 ," the 7 Public Rangelands Improvement Act of
1978, 35 and the ANILCA of 1980.5
FLPMA and the NFMA in conjunction make a strange situation even
stranger. Congress in FLPMA extended the multiple use, sustained yield management standard enunciated in the 1960 MUSYA" 8 to the BLM public lands,
giving the BLM almost the same basic authority as the Forest Service. 9
From that point, however, Congress sharply distinguished between the two

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986). See also Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995). See generally 3 PNRL,
supra note 1, § 21C.0612][a].
347. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (1994).
348. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 21C.06[2][d].
349. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879)).
350. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).

351. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
352.
353.
354.
355.

30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1026 (1994). See infra Part VI.D.3.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). See infra Part VI.D.3.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994).

356. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1994).
357. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994).
358. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
359. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994), with 43 U.S.C. §§1702(c), 1732 (1994).
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largest federal land management systems for no discernible reason save history.
Each agency is required to conduct land use planning, but the planning provisions of the NFMA and the FLPMA differ dramatically.' The two agencies'
mandates to control livestock grazing now are substantially identical,"' yet the
resemblance between the actual practices of the Forest Service and those of the
BLM is largely coincidental. 62 The BLM is subject to interdepartmental quasi-judicial review; the Forest Service is not." The Forest Service has some
independent budgetary powers, but the BLM does not."6 The national forests
are deemed reserved and thus entitled to the benefits of implied reserved water
rights;' not so the BLM public lands.' Wilderness designation processes
on the two systems also differ, and such designations can dramatically affect
mineral exploration and development.' For purposes of this article, perhaps
the most important distinction between the authority of the two agencies is that
the BLM is responsible for mineral development on national forests as well as
its own lands."5 As a result, the NFMA is silent on the permissible extent and
manner of mining in the national forests.69 Whether or not these disparities

ultimately make much legal or managerial sense, the fact is that Congress in
1976 - even though it streamlined the law by repealing hundreds of obsolete
statutory sections - still saw fit to treat the two systems and the two agencies
differently.
Still, both FLPMA and the NFMA were major departures from preexisting
law. By adopting FLPMA, Congress for the first time vested the BLM with
general organic authority.3" The stated purposes of FLPMA are somewhat
conflicting and not binding except when specifically enacted elsewhere.37 ' Its
planning provisions are sufficiently vague (if not opaque) as to almost guarantee
failure.3' But the Act gave the agency impetus in the late 1970s to try to professionalize its management to achieve a far broader range of goals. That effort
would founder under the leadership of Secretary Watt, and the BLM essentially
had to start implementing FLPMA all over again under Presidents Bush and
3
ClintonY
FLPMA deals with a host of topics, including processes such as plan-

360. See CoGGINs, Er AL., supra note 30.
361. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753 (1994).
362. See, e.g., 3 PNRL, supranote I, § 19.0511].
363. Local decisions in the national forest system are subject to internal review, but the Forest Service has
no judicial organ similar to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.
364. See infra notes 398-407 and accompanying text.
365. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
366. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
367. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994), with 43 U.S.C. §1782 (1994).
368. See, eg., 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-45 (1994).
369. The Forest Service has authority under the 1897 Organic Act, however, to regulate activities, including mining, for the purpose of preserving the forests from destruction. See 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994); Clouser v.
Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995).
370. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1731-1745 (1994).
371. See id. § 1701(b).
372. See id. § 1712. See also COGGINS, ET AL., supra note 30.
373. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, at ch. 19.
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ning,374 the making of withdrawals375 and exchanges, 6 wilderness designation, " and the issuance of rights-of-way, 87 all of which may affect the extent of mining activity on the public lands. 9 Unlike the analogous provision
in the NFMA, the general multiple use mandate of FLPMA encompasses minerals.' The specific provisions governing mineral interests include a requirement that conveyances of title by the Secretary of the Interior reserve to the
United States all minerals, along with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove them 81 The Secretary may convey minerals along with title to the surface, however, upon finding that there are no known minerals or that reservation of mineral rights in the United States is interfering with or precluding
appropriate nonmineral development deemed to be a more beneficial use of the
land. 2 Conveyance of mineral interests is conditioned on receipt of fair market value and administrative costs. 3 The Act also requires recordation of
mining claims on the BLM public lands. The owner of an unpatented lode or
placer mining claim located before FLPMA's adoption had three years to make
an initial filing of a notice of intention to hold the claim. 3' Additional filings
are due on an annual basis. 31 The owners of claims located after the enactment of FLPMA must comply with annual filing requirements .3 Noncompliance is conclusively deemed to constitute an abandonment of the claim. 7
FLPMA carved out the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA),3 specifying that the Area would remain subject to the mining laws, but that any patent issued for mining claims within the area would be subject to "reasonable
regulations" designed "to protect the scenic, scientific, and environmental values
of the public lands" within the CDCA.3 9
The National Forest Management Act, passed in reaction to a judicial ban
on clearcutting, ° essentially is a micro and macro land use planning law. It is
far more detailed and specific than any preceding federal land law, but it focuses on trees and other renewable resources, not minerals. The NFMA retains the
multiple use, sustained yield standard (which omits any explicit reference to

374. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1994).
375. See id. § 1714.
376. See id. § 1716.
377. See id. § 1782.
378. See id. §§ 1761-1771.
379. See, e.g., id. § 1712(e)(3) (specifying procedures for withdrawal of lands from operation of the General Mining Law); id. § 1761(a)(2)-(3) (authorizing the issuance of rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines and
slurry and emulsion systems).
380. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732(a), 1702(c) (1994).
381. See id. § 1719(a).
382. See id. § 1719(b)(1).
383. See id. § 1719(b)(2).
384. See id. § 1744(a)(1).
385. See id.
386. See id.
387. See id. § 1744(b): See also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (statutory abandonment provisions did not violate the due process or takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment).
388. See 43 U.S.C. § 1781 (1994).
389. See id. § 1781(o.
390. See infra notes 540-45 and accompanying text.
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minerals development)" but overlays it with a planning process that ultimately will reduce considerably the traditional flexibility accorded to multiple use
managers." The Act imposes general restrictions on all timber harvests 3
and more stringent restrictions on harvests by means of clearcuts.394
After 20 years, the impact of the NFMA still is not entirely clear. The
judicial decisions in which the validity of national forest plans were at issue do
not yet form a coherent pattern. As of 1997, the biodiversity provisions of the
Act do not equal the biodiversity contentions of the forest preservationists, 5
and the courts are split on whether clearcutting is to be the norm or the exceptional harvest method.3' In the Pacific Northwest, the meaning of the NFMA
is almost irrelevant because restrictions on timber harvests stemming from the
ESA, NEPA, and the CWA have eclipsed the NFMA issues.397
The Forest Service has long contended that the traditional practice of determining the level of agency operating funds through annual appropriations instead of allowing the agency to retain receipts from timber sales for its own use
precludes it from rational management of the resources under its jurisdiction.9 In 1974, Congress responded to this plea for greater budgetary control
by enacting the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
(RPA), 399 which acknowledges the Forest Service's need for reliable funding
estimates to plan for programs such as reforestation.400 The Act requires that
the agency prepare an Assessment every ten years to describe the renewable
resources of the nation's forests and rangelands, 4 ' a Program every five years
to propose long-range goals and attach specific costs to planned activities,'
and an annual Report to evaluate the consistency of Forest Service activities
with Program objectives. 413 The RPA also requires the President to submit to
Congress a Statement of Policy once every five years to assist in framing budget requests for Forest Service activities" 4 and a Statement of Reasons to explain why annual budget requests are inadequate to achieve the goals of the
Statement of Policy. 5 The RPA has had little impact on budgetary practices
concerning the Forest Service, in large part because the courts have found allegations of noncompliance with provisions such as those requiring a Presidential

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
L. REV.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600(3), 1601(c)(1) & (d)(1), 1602, 1604(e)(1) (1994).
See id. § 1604. See generally 2 PNRL, supra note 1, § 1017.05.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E) (1994).
See id. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
See generally Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN.
869 (1997).
See infra notes 540-45 and accompanying text.
See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 20.03[21-[3], 20.0411].
See COGGINS, ET AL., supra note 3, at 631.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1994).
See COGOINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at 631.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
See id. § 1602.
See id. § 1606(c).
See id. § 1606(a).
See id. § 1606(b).
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explanation of budgetary shortfalls to be beyond the judicial ken.' The
statute's planning requirements may have been more effective in improving
long-range planning by the agency, but the RPA
is "best understood as the last
7
gasp of unfettered Forest Service discretion.','1
Of the remaining three important public natural resources statutes enacted
during the 1970s, one had little direct relevance to mineral production on the
federal lands. The Public Rangeland Improvements Act (PRIA) of 1978,40g as
its name indicates, is directed toward grazing activity on the public lands. Like
FLPMA, PRIA purports to treat the BLM and the Forest Service alike, but
reflects important differences in directing their management of grazing lands.
The Act recognized the deteriorating condition of the public rangelands and the
need for reform of multiple use management and funding practices.' It also
declared the adoption of a fee for livestock grazing permits based on annual
changes in the cost of production to be in the public interest as a means of
preventing economic disruption of the western livestock industry.410 PRIA

mandates that both the Forest Service and the BLM conduct periodic inven" ' charge fees for grazing which represent the fair
tories of range conditions,41
41
market value of that use, and implement experimental stewardship programs
to explore innovative grazing management policies such as cooperative projects
with state agencies.4"3 But PRIA does not require that the Forest Service give
range improvement its highest management priority,4

4

excludes that agency

from the statute's range improvement funding program,"' and exempts the
national grasslands administered by that agency from all of its provisions.4"6
PRIA, like FLPMA, sought to improve the condition of the range while continuing to accommodate the interests of ranchers." 7
The other two statutes bear directly on minerals-related activities on the
federal lands. The principal purpose of the Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments (FCLAA) of 1976,'4 ' adopted over President Ford's veto, was to eliminate speculative holding of coal leases occasioned mainly by the Interior
Department's failure to enforce the due diligence and continued operation conditions on leasing and the availability of leases on a noncompetitive basis.419

406. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
407. COGGINS, ET AL., supranote 3, at 632.
408. See Pub. L. No. 95-914, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1994)).
409. See 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(l)-(4) (1994).
410. See id. § 1901(a)(5).
411. See id. § 1903.
412. See id. § 1905.
413. See id. § 1908(a).
414. See id. § 1903(b).
415. See id. § 1904.
416. See id. § 1907.
417. See generally George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA,
PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTh. L. 1 (1983).
418. See Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1080.
419. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 22.01[1]. At the time of the FCLAA's adoption, "a few large companies controlled the vast majority of federal coal deposits and large tracts of federal coal lands remained idle."
Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997).
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The statute replaced the prospecting permits which authorized entry under the
pre-1976 Mineral Leasing Act with exploration licenses subject to environmental constraints."2 The old prospecting permits had vested in permittees the
right to explore for coal on the tract covered by the permit and the right to
apply for a preference right lease upon the discovery of coal in commercial
quantities."2 The Secretary of the Interior could not deny a preference right
lease upon such discovery, but could demand proof that lease operations would
be profitable after compliance with applicable environmental requirements. 2
The post-1976 exploration license allows exploration for coal deposits on federal lands, but confers no rights even upon discovery of such deposits. 3 The
agency must conduct an environmental evaluation before issuing a license and,
under Interior Department regulations, will not issue a license when significant
and lasting4 degradation to the lands involved or to endangered species is likely
42
to result.

The FCLAA also required the Interior Secretary to develop comprehensive
land use plans to determine the suitability of lands for leasing.4' Leasing is
barred absent preparation of a land use plan and leasing must proceed in a
manner consistent with the plan.4' Leasing is also dependent on consent of
the surface land management agency.427 To address the ability of speculators

under the pre-1976 system to enter the market for federal coal at very low cost,
the FCLAA substituted a competitive bidding system for the old noncompetitive
preference right leasing program. Competitive leasing is conducted through
sealed bidding, and bids are evaluated by the agency for compliance with bid
requirements and terms, including payment of fair market value. 28 The district
court in the Powder River Coal case4' reached the dubious conclusion that
the disposal of over a billion and a half tons of coal in Wyoming and Montana
in 1982 complied with the fair market value requirement. Another of the
FCLAA's anti-speculation provisions subjects every lease to a condition of
diligent development, typically within ten years of lease issuance.' Lessees
who fail to satisfy this requirement forfeit their leaseholds.43' Despite the
scope of the statutory changes wrought by the 1976 FCLAA, the statute's impact has been minimized by the dearth of large-scale coal leasing on the federal
lands since the early 1970s.
The decade of the 1970s came to a striking close with the adoption in

420. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 22.03[2][a].
421. See 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (repealed 1976).
422. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berglund, 609 F.2d 553, 555 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
423. See 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994).
424. See 43 C.F.R. § 3410.2-2(a) (1997).
425. See 3 PNRL, supra note I, § 22.0312][b].
426. See 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i) (1994).
427. See 43 C.F.R. § 3400.3 (1997).
428. See 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(l) (1994); 43 C.F.Rt § 3422.3-2(b) (1997).
429. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 677 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Mont. 1985), affd in part, 871 F.2d 849
(9th Cir. 1989).
430. See 30 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1994); 43 C.F.R § 3480.0-5(a)(6), (13) (1997).
431. See 43 C.F.R. § 3483.2(a) (1997); Mountain States Resources Corp., 111 IBLA 160 (1989).
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December 1980 of ANILCA,4' a statute with significant implications for the

fate of mineral production on vast reaches of the federal lands. In one fell
swoop, Congress added more than 100 million acres to the national park, wildlife refuge, and wilderness preservation systems, most of it from former BLM
lands. This reallocation more than doubled the acreage in the national parks,
nearly tripled the size of the wildlife refuge system, and almost quadrupled the
size of federal wilderness holdings. 433 Much of this land was thereby made

unavailable for mineral exploration and development.
The Act was not uniformly preservationist in character, however. It authorized the sale to Alaskan Natives of title to land beneath meandered waters,434
approved pending applications for Native selections,435 and confirmed tentative
approvals of pending state land selections, subject to valid existing Native
rights.4' It adopted a preference for subsistence hunting and fishing uses by
Alaskan natives to preserve the social and cultural values of rural Alaskans.437

It recognized access rights across Forest Service lands, 43s perhaps even outside
Alaska;439 and it temporarily mandated minimum timber harvests in the Tongass

National Forest.' 0 The effect of ANILCA has been to leave 59 percent of
Alaska's 375 million acres in federal ownership, about 28 percent in state ownership, 12 percent in the hands of Native Alaskans, and the remaining one percent under private control. Disputes arising from the various selection processes
continue to proliferate. 1
ANILCA also required various assessments of the mineral producing potential of the public lands in Alaska. The statute required the Secretary of the
Interior to conduct a study of all federal lands in Alaska north of 68 degrees
north latitude and east of the western boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve and in conservation system units (such as national parks and wildlife
refuges)" established by the Act to determine their potential oil and gas resources. 3 After considering the impact of oil and gas development on wildlife resources, the national need for development of mineral resources, and the
national interest in wilderness preservation and protection of wildlife resources,
the Secretary was to submit an initial report to Congress by 1980 and subsequent annual reports on the Secretary's progress in implementing the statute.' ANILCA required the Interior Secretary to establish an oil and gas

432. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of titles 16 and 43 of the
U.S.C.)).
433. See COGOINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at 144.
434. See 43 U.S.C. § 1631(b) (1994).
435. See id. § 1634.
436. See id. § 1635(c).
437. See id. §§ 3111-3126. See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.03[6].
438. See 43 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1994).
439. See Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993).
440. See COGGINS Er AL., supra note 3, at 145.
441. See 1 PNRL, supra note 1, § 10C.03[6].
442. See 43 U.S.C. § 3102(4) (1994).
443. See id. § 3141(a)-(b).
444. See id. § 3141(c), (e).
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leasing program under the Mineral Leasing Act on federal lands not covered by
this study, except on lands where applicable law prohibits leasing, lands included in the National Petroleum Reserve, and units of the National Wildlife Refuge
System where exploration for and development of oil and gas would be incompatible with Refuge purposes.' Leases are subject to competitive bidding," 6
exploration is subject to whatever requirements the Secretary deems appropriate
for protecting the land for the purpose for which it is managed under applicable
law,447 and lease suspension and cancellation are authorized to prevent immediate and irreparable damage.'
ANILCA also required the submission of reports concerning the impact of
oil and gas exploration, development, and production in the coastal plain of the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The statute authorized the Secretary to allow
exploratory activity within the plain in a manner that avoids significant adverse
effects on fish and wildlife resources.

9

But ANILCA barred leasing and pro-

duction of oil and gas within the Refuge pending further action by Congress.' ° A fierce debate over the appropriate fate of the Refuge has raged
ever since, with environmentalists seeking to bar all oil and gas development by
designating the entire Refuge as wilderness and proponents of development
proposing legislation to open the area to leasing."5! Finally, ANILCA authorizes the President to transmit a recommendation to Congress that mineral exploration, development, or extraction not permitted in Alaska under ANILCA or
other laws be allowed based on an "urgent national need for the mineral activity" which outweighs other public values and potential adverse environmental
impacts." 2 Any such recommendation takes effect only upon enactment of a
joint resolution of approval." 3
VII. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAW IN THE COURTS, 1976-1997

The courts generally displayed a much more restrained bent during the
period between 1976 and 1997 than they did in the progressive/conservation
era.4 4 Nevertheless, simply by confirming previous doctrines, some of constitutional magnitude, and enforcing statutory mandates adopted during the Preservation Age, they have had an enormous impact on the shape of public land law.
The Supreme Court occasionally has embarked on important new directions,
such as in its interpretation of standing doctrine, with consequences as yet unclear.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. § 3148(a). See also id. § 3149.
id. § 3148(d).
id. § 3148(f).
id. § 3148(i).
id. § 3142(a).
id. § 3143.
infra Part VII.
16 U.S.C. § 3232(a)-(b) (1994).
id. § 3232(d).
supraPart V.A.
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A. ConstitutionalLaw Decisions
The Supreme Court confirmed the plenary authority vested by the Property
Clause in the federal government to manage the public lands, as indicated
above, in 1976, Kleppe v. New Mexico.455 In less than convincing fashion, it
expounded in the Granite Rock case 6 on the preemptive scope of federal legislation over contrary state environmental and land use regulation."57 Subsequent attacks on the notion of federal supremacy have met a similar fate. In
United States v. Gardner,4 8 in 1997, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument
that the Forest Service lacked the authority to restrict grazing on national forest
lands in Nevada; the rancher had claimed that title to those lands reverted to the
state upon admission to the Union. It also gave short shrift to the rancher's
contention that federal ownership of eighty percent of lands in the state violated
the equal footing doctrine. Distinguishing Pollard's Lessee, 9 the court declared that the equal footing doctrine "applies to political rights and sovereignty, not to economic or physical characteristics of the states."' In other decisions, the lower courts, confirming the teaching of the Camfield decision,41
approved of agency reliance on the Property Clause to regulate conduct on
private land which was harming or threatening to harm federal lands and resources.

462

After the Supreme Court's decision in the 1995 Lopez case, 3 opponents
of conservation and preservation legislation sought to establish limits on the
federal government's authority to base such legislation on the Commerce
Clause, the most important source of regulatory power over the federal lands
aside from the Property Clause. These attempts have not succeeded, as the
lower courts have rejected constitutional attacks on the Lacey Act, 46 the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act,"5 the Eagle Protection Act,' and, most
importantly, the Endangered Species Act.' The Fourth Circuit, however, in
1997 invalidated a regulation extending the Clean Water Act's dredge and fill
permit program to isolated wetlands as beyond the scope of the statute in order
to avoid the Commerce Clause issues that would have arisen from a contrary
interpretation of the Act."6

455. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
456. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
457. See supra Part II.C.
458. 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 264 (1997).
459. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
460. Gardner,107 F.3d at 1319.
461. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
462. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
See also Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 81 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.), aff d on rehearingby an equally divided vote,
89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764 (1997).
463. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
464. See United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996).
465. See United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996).
466. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996).
467. See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
468. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
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In other constitutional developments, 9 the Supreme Court has revitalized
the Tenth Amendment as a potential limitation on federal regulatory authority,47° but the authority of the federal land management agencies has not been
affected. An Eighth Circuit decision temporarily raised the specter of a rebirth
of the nondelegation doctrine,471 but the decision was subsequently vacated.' The Supreme Court in 1992 concluded that provisions in an appropriation bill designed to preclude judicial challenges to timber sales in several national forests did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they
changed underlying laws rather than amounting to congressional interference in
ongoing litigation."a 3
Perhaps the constitutional law provision whose interpretation during this
period has the potential to work the most significant change in public land law
is the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III. In a pair of decisions in
1990 and 1992 rendered in part on constitutional and in part on statutory
grounds, the Supreme Court erected barriers to standing to sue that it had swept
away in the early 1970s in the Mineral King474 and SCRAP 475 cases. In the

1990 Lujan decision,476 a divided Court held that a large environmental group
and its members lacked standing to challenge a series of revocations by the
Interior Department of federal land withdrawals. The Court refused to address
the merits of the myriad alleged substantive and procedural deficiencies because, among other things, the purported withdrawal review program did not
amount to final agency action,47 and, in any event, the affidavits submitted by
the plaintiff's members did not allege with sufficient specificity use of the particular lands affected. 48 In the 1992 Lujan case, 4' the Court, speaking again
without consensus, held that another environmental group lacked standing to
challenge the Interior Department's position that the ESA did not apply to
agency activities conducted outside the United States. This time, the affidavits
failed to demonstrate a definite time frame in which the group's members intended to visit the sites at which wildlife would allegedly be affected by noncompliance with the ESA.1 ° A plurality of the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the redressability component of Article III standing as

469. The application of the Takings Clause to activities on the federal lands during this period is analyzed
supra at Part II.D.
470. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
471. See South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. granted
and vacated, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).
472. See South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 106 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1996).
473. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). See also Mount Graham Coalition v.
Thomas, 53 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995); National Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 1437
(9th Cir. 1993); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994).
474. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
475. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
476. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
477. See id. at 890-94.
478. See id. at 885-89.
479. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
480. See id. at 564.
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well. 4
In the wake of the two Lujan decisions, many observers predicted that
environmental groups would find themselves unceremoniously dumped outside
the courthouse doors with increasing frequency. Had the prediction been borne
out, opponents of development, including mining, on the federal lands would
have faced increased difficulties in gaining access to a judicial forum to challenge those activities. The pundits may yet prove to be correct, though these
authors doubted the conventional wisdom right from the start.4 To date, the
two cases have not significantly affected the ability of public interest environmental litigants to convince the courts to reach the merits in public lands cases.
The courts have easily distinguished the Lujan precedents. 3 In one case, for
example, affidavits demonstrating that an environmental group's members regularly used areas potentially affected by subsidence from coal mining were sufficient to satisfy the constitutional injury in fact requirement in a suit challenging
the validity of Interior Department coal mining regulations. 4 In another case,
the court rejected the contention that the alleged injuries suffered by an environmental group seeking to overturn the Forest Service's recognition of valid existing rights in mining claims in an area withdrawn from development were too
remote simply because third parties (the mining companies) would have to act
before mineral development began."'
Indeed, the litigants most frequently thrown out of court on standing
grounds subsequent to the Lujan cases have been those seeking to challenge
restrictions on development.' In Marathon Oil Co. V. Babbit,417 in 1996, an
oil company alleging that the government improperly deprived it of its right to
bid competitively on an oil and gas lease tract foundered on the redressability
component of constitutional standing because the court lacked the power to
compel the government to make land available for leasing. In Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy,4 a nonprofit corporation representing individuals
who sought increased access to minerals in a national forest was barred from
seeking judicial review of aspects of a land and resource management plan
because removal of the challenged provisions would not necessarily result in
elimination of restrictions on development. 9

481. See id. at 571.
482. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Whither Tony's Excellent Adventure? - The
Impact of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation on Public Natural Resources Law, 5th Annual Workshop,
Developments and Trends in Public Land and Mining Law, ABA Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and
Environmental Law (March 1991).
483. See, e.g., Siena Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 1995); Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson,
35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1993).
484. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 835 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1993). See also National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20200 n.23 (D.D.C. 1993)
485. See Wilderness Socy v. Robertson, 824 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mont. 1993).
486. See, e.g., Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994); Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1993); Forest Conservation Council v. Espy, 835
F. Supp. 1202 (D. Idaho 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1994).
487. 966 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1997).
488. 835 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Wyo. 1993), affd, 85 F.3d 641 (Table), 1996 WL 223925 (10th Cir. 1996).
489. See id. at 1369.
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The lower courts also have used the zone of interest test derived from the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to bar access to
the courts by developmental interests.' A utility whose competitor was
awarded the right to construct a crude oil pipeline through a national forest
lacked standing to attack the validity of an environmental impact statement, for
example, because its economic interests conflicted with a general public interest
in the environment."' The Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Bennett v.
Spear' should make it easier for developmental interests to surmount this
prudential obstacle to standing under the ESA, the statute involved in that case,
but there may still be room for the government to argue that economic interests
do not fall within the zone of interests of NEPA." 3
The Lujan decisions almost certainly have forced public interest litigants of
the sort who have initiated much of the most important litigation in the public
lands arena in the last three decades to spend more care preparing affidavits and
more in attorneys' time defending against motions to dismiss. These decisions
have not appreciably redressed the balance of standing law to the detriment of
these litigants, however.
B. EnvironmentalAssessment and Planning Decisions
The Supreme Court's persistent hostility to NEPA manifested itself during
this period, when the Court took the narrow view of every NEPA question it
addressed. 494 In non-public lands cases, the Court decided that substantive
review of agency decisions with environmental consequences is unavailable
under NEPA.45 For example, the Court held that an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was not required before allowing the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant to reopen; it reasoned that only proposed actions having a reasonably close connection to a change in the physical environment may trigger EIS
preparation responsibilities.' In a 1983 decision, the Court deferred to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's implausible conclusion that the risk of radioactive discharge from long-term storage of nuclear waste was nonexistent.49
The tone for the Court's treatment of NEPA in public lands cases was set
in the 1976 Kleppe v. Sierra Club case."9 In Kleppe, the Court refused to require the Interior Department to prepare an EIS addressing the regional conse490. See, e.g., Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993);
County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 377 (D. Minn. 1997).
491. See City of Los Angeles v. United States Dep't of Agric., 950 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
492. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
493. See Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 1997 WL 781027, at *10 (D. Wyo. Dec. 12, 1997);
See, e.g., County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 377 (D. Minn. 1997).
494. See COGOINS, Er AL., supra note 3, at 361. See also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's EnvironmentalLaw Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343,
369-72 (1989).
495. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). See also Robertson
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
496. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
497. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
498. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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quences of resuming coal leasing in the Northern Great Plains after a moratorium. The agency committed to preparing a national programmatic EIS and sitespecific statements on individual leases, but the environmental plaintiffs asserted that the agency was also obliged to prepare a separate EIS to assess the
consequences of resumed leasing in the multi-state area of greatest development
potential. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that NEPA did not dictate a
regional EIS because the agency was involved in no formal "federal action" of
regional scope. 49' In subsequent decisions, the Court held that an EIS need not
accompany an appropriations bill because it did not qualify as "legislation;"
refused to require supplementation of an EIS prepared by the Corps of Engineers on a dam project along the Rogue River,"1 and upheld a regulation issued by the Council on Environmental Quality watering down the requirement
that an EIS include a worst case analysis.'
The record in the lower courts was not nearly so one-sided. On the one
hand, efforts to rely on NEPA to block mineral development have failed in a
series of cases. The Interior Department convinced the Ninth Circuit that the
BLM's review of placer gold mining operations causing a cumulative disturbance of five acres or less per year was not a sufficiently major federal action
to trigger NEPA evaluation responsibilities. 3 The mine operators did not receive federal funding, the agency's approval of these mines was
nondiscretionary, and its obligation to monitor compliance with regulatory constraints on degradation and issue notices of noncompliance was insufficient."'
In other cases involving prospective mineral development, the courts have likewise found NEPA's EIS preparation requirement inapplicable because of the
ministerial nature of the agency's activities. The Eighth Circuit ruled in 1980
that issuance of a mineral patent under the GML is not a major federal action,
either because approval is nondiscretionary or because issuance of the patent
does not by itself enable its holder to do anything. °5 A Montana district court
held that the Forest Service's determination of the validity of a mining claim
under the Wilderness Act was a nondiscretionary action for which NEPA evaluation would be pointless.50 In Hoyl v. Babbitt,5°7 a Colorado district court
refused to require compliance with NEPA in connection with denial of suspension of a coal lease not yet in production because that decision did not alter the
status quo."°
Agencies sometimes succeeded in avoiding the responsibility of preparing

499. Id. at 405-06.
500. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
501. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
502. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
503. See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
504. See id. at 1314.
505. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
See also Concerned Citizens for Responsible Mining, 131 IBLA 257 (1994) (on reconsideration).
506. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Robertson, 824 F. Supp. 947, 953 (D. Mont. 1993).
507. 927 F. Supp. 1411 (D. Colo. 1996), affld on other grounds, 129 F.3d 1377 (10th Cir. 1997).
508. See Hoyl, 927 F. Supp. at 1418.
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an EIS based on requirements or commitments to engage in environmental
assessment at a later stage of the project or on previous preparation of a
programmatic EIS.1 The most recent of this line of cases is the 1997 decision in Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Service"

Envi-

ronmental groups asserted noncompliance with NEPA in attacking the process
by which the Forest Service planned to issue oil and gas leases in the Shoshone
National Forest. The district court rejected the government's contention that it
may wait until lease issuance before undertaking an environmental assessment.
The agency passed the "go/no go" point when it authorized nearly a million
12
acres of the Shoshone for leasing. Relying on a 1983 D.C. Circuit decision,
the district court concluded that the Forest Service had to either retain the au-

thority to preclude surface disturbing activities pending completion of a complete environmental evaluation or assess the full environmental consequences of
leasing at the time of that authorization."1 3 The court nevertheless refused to
halt the leases because it concluded that the EIS prepared at the time the agency
decided to commit the million acres to leasing was sufficiently site-specific to

preclude the need for subsequent, additional evaluation

4

When an EIS is required, judicial review of the adequacy of statements

dealing with the potential adverse effects of mineral-related activity is often
deferential. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Park Service did not violate

NEPA in its review of the cumulative impacts of mining operations in the parks
and preserves in Alaska. 1 5 The agency was not obliged to analyze mitigation

measures more thoroughly than it did because it had not yet authorized actual
mining operations 16 Additionally, evaluation of proposals to lease tracts of
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for oil and gas exploration5 7 and expand a

mine located adjacent to a national forest518 also passed muster. In another

case involving oil and gas leasing on the OCS, the Second Circuit held that the
EIS did not improperly fail to consider separating exploration from production
or of leasing tracts other than those selected.5 9
On the other hand, NEPA challenges have succeeded in delaying or halting

509. See, e.g., North Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1992); Park County Resource
Council v. United States Dep't of Agiic., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733
F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977).
510. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980); Ventling v.
Bergland, 479 F. Supp. 174 (D.C.S.D.), affld, 615 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1979).
511. 981 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1997).
512. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Bob Marshall Alliance
v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d
1441, 1446-51 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
513. See Wyoming Outdoor Council, 981 F. Supp. at 19.
514. See id. at 20.
515. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1992).
516. See id. at 890-92.
517. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
518. See Wright v. Inman, 923 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Nev. 1996).
519. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1386-88 (2d Cir. 1977). For cases
reflecting deferential review of agency proposals that did not involve mining, see e.g., Swanson v. United
States Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996); Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d
1346 (9th Cir. 1994).
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many agency proposals on the basis of insufficient consideration of potential
environmental consequences. The most dramatic cases have involved activities
other than mining. The Forest Service and the BLM have consistently failed to
convince the courts that proposed timber harvesting actions would have insufficient adverse environmental effects to require preparation of an EIS."2 The
two agencies' failure to comply with NEPA was a significant component of the
Ninth Circuit's decision to shut down timber harvesting in the habitat of the
northern spotted owl in the early 1990s.1 2' The Forest Service's evaluation of
the consequences of its Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I) wilderness recommendations for 60 million acres was similarly characterized as
deficient.'
But NEPA noncompliance has adversely affected implementation of proposals to allow mineral development on the federal lnds as well. The BLM's
failure to consider the cumulative impacts of approving placer mining in the
watershed of a national wild and scenic river violated NEPA,523 resulting in
the issuance of an injunction preventing the agency from approving any mining
plan pending an evaluation of those impacts.524 A district court enjoined the
Interior Department's coal leasing program on the basis of the agency's failure
to explain a change in the description of the scope of the program from a "minerals allocation recommendation system" to a "minerals activity recommendation system."2 The courts have chastised impact statements perceived to reflect a bias in favor of project implementation, such as OCS oil and gas
leasing."a This kind of judicial scrutiny of NEPA compliance efforts leaves
any agency which short-circuits NEPA's procedures to facilitate development
on the federal lands in a potentially precarious position.

FLPMA527 and the NFMA5 28 impose on the BLM and the Forest Ser-

vice the obligation to engage in formal land use planning as a prerequisite to
implementation of their multiple use responsibilities. Subsequent management
decisions must conform to the plans. 529 Relatively few cases have tested the
willingness of the courts to closely scrutinize the BLM's compliance with
FLPMA planning procedures. In an early case, a federal district court in Nevada
approved a vacuous plan that did nothing to halt excessive grazing. 5' Ex520. See, e.g., Smith v. United States Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994); City of Tenakee Springs
v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.
1988).
521. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
522. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
523. See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 664 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Alaska 1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.
1988).
524. See id. at 1313.
525. See Natural Resouces Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977), modified on
other grounds,454 F. Supp. 148 (D.D.C. 1978).
526. See Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373 (D.C. Mass. 1984).
527. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1994).
528. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
529. See id. § 1604(i) (NFMA); See also 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (1994) (FLPMA).
°
530. See Natual Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), affd, 819 F.2d
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pressing its reluctance to become a "rangemaster" by engaging in anything
more than superficial review, the court set the stage for extremely deferential if
not meaningless review of BLM planning activities.53' A different court was
willing to review the substantive merits of BLM plans for off-road vehicle
(ORV) use on the public lands.5 2
The decisions involving Forest Service planning under the NFMA are far

more numerous, but most focus on timber harvesting and its impact on recreational or preservational use of the national forests. In several cases challenging
Forest Service management decisions taken under pre-NFMA plans, the courts
upheld a decision to sell less timber than the amount called for in the plan533
and found that the EISs accompanying proposed timber sales paid insufficient

attention to potential adverse impacts on water quality

34

When litigants be-

gan challenging the validity of the new land and resource management plans

(LRMPs) developed under the NFMA, a threshold question was whether the
plans were ripe for review before implementation. Most courts decided that they
were." One of the first cases to address the merits of a LRMP was the Rio
Grande case," where the court essentially remanded a plan to the Forest Service to start over. The court refused to accept what appeared to be a trumped
up justification for a decision to increase harvesting levels regardless of the
economic or environmental consequences. The agency failed to identify, for
example, the unspecified technology that would rectify damage to the watershed.537 Another Colorado district court decision enjoined timber sales pending
amendments to the plan to assure that the land was suitable for harvesting and
that the lands could be adequately restocked,53 as the statute requires09

One of the more interesting controversies that has developed in the NFMA
cases is the extent to which the Forest Service may allow clearcutting. The
statute was adopted in the wake of the Monongahela decision," which inter-

927 (9th Cir. 1987).
531. See id. at 1062.
532. See American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 543 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Cal. 1982). But cf. Sierra Club v.
Clark, 756 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding the BLM's refusal to close area to ORV use because the plan
allowed it).
533. See Intermountain Harvest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988). But see American Timber Co. v. Berglund, 473 F. Supp. 310 (D. Mont. 1979) (EIS justifying reduction of harvesting levels
was defective).
534. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd in part,485 U.S. 439 (1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United
States, 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984), appeal dismissed in part as moot, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1987).
535. See, e.g., Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conserva.
tion League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 867 F. Supp.
1026, 1042-43 (N.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 83 F.3d 386 (1lth Cir. 1996). Cf. Sierra Club v. Robertson;, 28 F.3d
753 (8th Cir. 1994) (environmental group lacked sufficiently immediate injury to demonstrate standing to
challenge land and resource management plan).
536. See Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989), appealdismissed,
No. 89-1362 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1991).
537. See id. at 984-86.
538. See Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990), on subsequent appeal, 11 F.3d 1545
(10th Cir. 1993).
539. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (1994).
540. See West Virginia Div., Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
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preted the 1897 Organic Act as prohibiting that timber harvesting practice. A
federal district court in Texas construed the NFMA provisions that addresses
clearcutting5" as permitting that practice only in exceptional
circumstances.542 The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the exceptional
circumstances standard "erected too high a barrier to even-aged management "' 43 and that the Forest Service complied with its responsibility to protect
forest diversity and resources when it endorsed a plan that adopted clearcutting
as the norm. The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court's approval of a plan providing for even-aged management on eighty percent of suitable
lands, denouncing not only the agency's predisposition toward clearcutting, but
its entire planning process.544 The Sixth Circuit never even cited the Fifth
Circuit's opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Sixth
Circuit's decision and, presumably, to resolve the conflict between Circuits on
the threshold ripeness issue and, perhaps, on the merits, too. The same district
court in Texas whose decision on clearcutting was overruled by the Fifth Circuit recently enjoined timber harvesting in the Texas national forests again
because of the Forest Service's failure to comply with NFMA monitoring and
inventorying requirements.5"
The provision of the NFMA requiring that LRMPs "provide for diversity
of plant and animal communities" ' has provided further grist for the judicial
mill. One court characterized this provision as so vague as to be virtually devoid of substantive content. 7 The Seventli Circuit, while treating the diversity
requirement more seriously, ultimately approved LRMPs alleged to have slighted that requirement, and it rejected the assertion that the statute requires the setting aside of large, unfragmented habitats. The Forest Service need not promote
"natural diversity" above other considerations. 5"
The NFMA planning provisions for the Forest Service are more detailed
and specific than the analogous FLPMA provisions for the BLM. This difference provides the courts with the basis for more closely scrutinizing the Forest
Service planning process, and in some cases they have begun to do so. Still, the
judicial inclination to defer to agency expertise in technical areas has prompted
549
some courts to afford plan challengers little more than a once-over-lightly.

541. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F) (1994).
542. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993), vacated and remanded, 38 F.3d 792
(5th Cir. 1994).
543. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1994).
544. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass'n,
Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 334 (1997).
545. See Sierra Club v. Gliclmaan, 974 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
546. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994).
547. See Krichbaum v. Kelley, 844 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 61 F.3d 900 (4th Cir.
1995) (Table).
548. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
549. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Or. 1993), affid, 109
F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally Federico Cheever, Four Failed Forest Standards: What We Can
Learnfrom the History of the NationalForestManagement Adts Substantive Timber Management Provisions,
OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
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C. PreservationDecisions
The statutes adopted during the Preservation Era have radically reshaped
the manner in which the federal lands and resources are managed. There is no
better or more dramatic example of the impact these laws have had on federal
public land law than the ESA. The long-running disputes over the northern
spotted owl and the anadromous fish in rivers of the Pacific Northwest highlight
the role of the courts in advancing the goal of protecting endangered or threatened wildlife.
The Supreme Court's decision in the 1978 Snail Darter case5" illustrated
the potentially disruptive impact which noncompliance with the ESA could
have on agency projects. The Court's literal reading of the statute mandated the
halting of construction of the Tellico Dam, even though it was close to completion, at least until Congress reversed that result. Judicial insistence on compliance with the statute produced similar results in the case of the northern spotted
owl. The Fish and Wildlife Service listed the owl only after a district court in
Washington State rejected its explanation for refusing to do so earlier."' The
designation of the bird's critical habitat also came in response to a court decree.' The failure of the Forest Service and the BLM to take seriously their
responsibilities in protecting the owl resulted in the issuance of sweeping injunctions which virtually shut down timber harvesting in affected areas of Oregon and Washington. 3 The Ninth Circuit later approved the Clinton
Administration's plan for protecting the owl in 1996 despite a host of attacks
by both the timber industry and environmentalists5 4
The Ninth Circuit took the statute one step further when it required the
Forest Service to reopen a completed LRMP to consider the plan's effect on the
chinook salmon, even though the fish was not listed until after the plan's adoption.555 It enjoined both ongoing and announced timber, range, and road projects under the plan to prevent irreversible resource commitments pending compliance with the ESA.556
The courts have assisted in implementation of all aspects of the species
listing and protection processes. They have enforced the statutory consultation
requirements through injunctions,557 although they have concluded that the

FWS need not engage in consultation when it merely provides advice on how
to avoid the taking prohibition on private land55 and that an injunction pre-

550. See Tennesse Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
551. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
552. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
553. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
554. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
555. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082
(1995).
556. See also Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 873 F. Supp. 365 (Idaho 1995).
557. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); House v. United States Forest Serv.,
974 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
558. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1996).
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venting construction of the northern tier oil pipeline was inappropriate because
a right-of-way permit did not authorize construction until full compliance with
the ESA had been achieved." 9 They have rejected as inadequate poorly pre-

pared biological opinions,"6 while concluding that action agencies need not
m ' They
adopt the measures recommended by the FWS in such an opinion.

have grappled with timing questions in applying the consultation requirements
to segmented activities such as hardrock mineral development and oil and gas
leasing that are similar to those encountered under NEPA 62 They have en-

joined projects deemed to be violative of the statutory duty to avoid jeopardizing species or harming their critical habitat.

3

They have interpreted the stat-

ute to impose an affirmative duty on agencies to conserve listed species," 4
although they have recognized that agencies retain discretion to determine the
means of compliance with the duty.56
The ESA's prohibition on the taking of listed species also has been the
focus of judicial concern. The leading case is the Supreme Court's 1995 decision of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for A Great Oregon.5 ' A group of small landowners and loggers challenged the Fish and

Wildlife Service's position that the prohibition on taking applies to significant
modification of critical habitat, but the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation as consistent with the statutory language and purposes."6 Other cases
have addressed the issue of whether a substantial risk of injury constitutes a
taking"6 and whether the prohibition applies at the individual or population

559. See No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 364-65 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
560. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or.
1994), remanded with instructions to vacate as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally James B.
Good & Patrick G. Mitchell, Wildlife and Mining Operations: Mutually Compatible or IrreconcilableDifferences?, 37 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 7-1 (1991).
561. See Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534
F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
562. Compare Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (refusing to
enjoin hardrock mineral prospecting in grizzly bear habitat because mitigation requirements would avert harm
to the species), and North Slope Borough v. Andrs, 642 F.2d 589, 607-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declining to halt
sale of offshore oil and gas leases on basis of alleged inadequacy of biological opinion because assessment of
impact on endangered species could await more concrete proposals for development), with Conner v. Burford,
848 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989) (refusing to allow deferral of specific evaluation of onshore oil leasing until more concrete exploration or production plans).
563. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260
(E.D. Tex. 1988), affid in part, vacated in part,and remanded, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
564. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741
F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring denial of water use permits that would have detracted from habitat for
listed fish species); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (barring the use of lead shot to prevent harm to bald eagles).
565. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dept' of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990)
(approving the district court's finding that the Navy did not violate the affirmative conservation duty in leasing lands and associated water rights to farmers, even though the leases required diversions which left less
water for the spawning of listed species).
566. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
567. See id. at 697-98.
568. Compare Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), and Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (yes) with National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.
R1R., Inc., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994) (no).
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level.6 9 The courts have enforced the criminal sanctions imposed by the Act
on individuals engaged in prohibited takings or related activities."70 The ESA
thus clearly has the potential to impair the ability of the federal land management agencies to authorize and private interests to proceed with mineral development on portions of the federal lands which constitute critical habitat for
listed species, although cases involving application of the ESA to minerals
development proposals are far fewer than are the analogous NEPA cases.
The courts have played a role in the implementation of other preservationoriented legislation, such as the Wilderness Act. They have deferred to
some" but not other agency determinations whose effect has been to exclude
lands from protection as wilderness. In a 1985 California district court decision,
the court overturned the Secretary of the Interior's decision to delete all splitestate lands (such as lands in which the government had conveyed away mineral interests and retained title to the surface) from the inventory of qualifying
wilderness areas. 5' In a subsequent decision, a Colorado district court halted
the withdrawal of allegedly valuable mineral lands from wilderness consideration due to the Secretary's failure to prepare a supplemental EIS.573 Similarly, in the RARE II case,574 the Ninth Circuit essentially halted logging and
other commercial development on more than one-third of all national forest
system lands on the basis of the agency's noncompliance with NEPA in conducting a wilderness inventory.
Even when mineral development in wilderness study areas (WSAs) has
been allowed, the courts have upheld agency regulation of those activities as a
means of preventing undue degradation and environmental protection. 575 The
D.C. Circuit prevented the issuance of mineral leases in national forest WSAs
absent the retention of agency authority to deny access for environmental protection purposes.57 6 A Utah district court in 1979 ruled that a company that
had acquired mineral location claims before the cut-off date for grandfathering
mining and mineral leasing in BLM WSAs could not build a road through a
potential WSA to the claims as a result of its potential to impair the suitability
of the area for preservation as wilderness. 77 The Tenth Circuit held three
years later that mineral leasing in WSAs is subject to the nonimpairment standard as to leases issued both before and after that cut-off date.57
569. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996) (raising but not resolving the issue).
570. See, e.g., United States v. Guthrie, 50 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Clark, 986
F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
571. See, eg., Smith v. United States Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994).
572. See, ag., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
573. See Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
574. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
575. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1994) (establishing management standard for BLM wilderness study areas).
576. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Bob Marshall Alliance v.
Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). For discussion of the permissible extent of mineral leasing in BLM wilderness study areas, see Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir.
1982).
577. See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979). See also Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
125 IBLA 175 (1993).
578. See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982). Congress later codi-
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Designated wilderness areas have been closed to new mineral location and
leasing since January 1, 1984.' In Clouser v. Espy, in 1994,"8 the Ninth
Circuit upheld the authority of the Forest Service to regulate access to pre-1984
mineral locations and leases exempted from the Act's development prohibitions
to preserve wilderness character.58 ' In Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 2 the BLM
approved a pre-designation lessee's application for a permit to drill, but the
courts affined the reversal of that decision by the Interior Board of Land Appeals based on the agency's failure to evaluate the environmental consequences
of drilling.
The cases that have arisen under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act58 have
been less frequent but no less contentious. In some instances, agency failure to
comply with statutory obligations has not adversely affected agency projects
such as timber sales.58 In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Harrell, in
1995," the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's finding that the Corps
of Engineers violated the statutory prohibition on assisting construction of a
water development project with adverse effects on river values. Both the Forest
Service and the BLM objected to the project because it would impede migration
and spawning of anadromous fish. The appellate court, however, interpreted the
prohibition on assistance to apply only when a federal agency assists others in
taking action with effects on a designated river. In this case, the Corps, by
limiting the function of the dam to flood control instead of water conservation,
chose an operating mode for the dam rather than licensed its operation?' But
the Act contributed to the denial of a mining company's application to build a
hydroelectric power facility to generate electricity for its gold mining operation
on a wild and scenic river. 587 The Act also has halted development that did
not involve mining or mineral leasing. In the Donner und Blitzen River
case, 51 for example, an Oregon district court enjoined implementation of a
comprehensive management plan which failed to take adequate account of the
adverse effects of grazing on river values and improperly allowed increased
vehicle access to the river area. 9
fled the prohibition on geothermal leasing in WSAs. See 30 U.S.C. § 226-3(a)(2) (1994). However,
nonimpairing exploration activities may continue. See Richard D. Sawyer, 127 IBLA 392 (1993).
579. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1994).
580. 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995).
581. Id. at 1537-39.
582. 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985), affd sub nom. Texaco Producing, Inc. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 776
(10th Cir. 1988).
583. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
584. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to enjoin timber sales due to failure to prepare timely management plan because preparation of plan
is not precondition to approval of sales and issuance of injunction would usurp agency's procedural autonomy).
585. 52 F.3d 1499 (9th Cir. 1995).
586. See id. at 1505-06.
587. See Swanson Mining Corp. v. FERC, 790 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Cf. Pierre J. Ott, 125 IBLA 250
(1993) (requiring BLM approval of operating plan for hardrock mining within a proposed river segment), and
Joe Trow, 123 IBLA 96 (1992) (same).
588. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Green, 953 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Or. 1997).
589. See id. at 1145-49.
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D. Multiple Use ManagementDecisions

The hallmark of the decisions involving judicial review of implementation
of the multiple use mandates of statutes such as FLPMA and the NFMA has
been deference to agency discretion. Ignoring an early unreported decision in
which it took the Forest Service to task for failing to afford "due consideration"
to the values reflected in the MUSYAse the* same Ninth Circuit later de-

scribed the MUSYA as a statute which "breathes discretion at every pore.""59
The court proceeded to uphold reductions of grazing allotments on multiple use
grounds. This deferential review posture has become typical of decisions reviewing agency implementation of other multiple use statutes. One court, for
example, refused to second-guess the Forest Service's determination that the
imposition of limitations on logging was consistent with reasonable multiple use
management, even though it would increase the risk of wildfires.5' Another
deferred to a BLM grazing plan which appeared to allow grazing at levels
which would significantly impair the land's usefulness for other purposes.593

The courts have regularly upheld restrictions on the use of motorized vehicles
in national forests5 94 and on BLM public lands.595 Refusals to restrict motorized access also have been upheld, however.5" The courts have deferred to

agency decisions allowing mineral development despite potential adverse effects
on wildlife, another protected multiple use,5" and have upheld agency decisions which seemed to completely ignore protection of watershed values.5 98
Occasionally, however, the courts read substantive limitations on agency

discretion into the statutes.5" In 1996, for example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted multiple use legislation as precluding an agency from dedicating an area
to a single use, in this case preservation. 600 In an earlier decision, the Ninth
Circuit enjoined the Forest Service from allowing a mine operator to reopen an
access road due to the predicted adverse effects on a fragile population of wild

sheep which grazed in the area."I The adoption of statutes such as the ESA
which elevate the protection afforded to particular resources (such as endan-

590. See Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20292, 20293 (9th Cir. 1973).
591. Perkins v. Berglund, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp.
1317, 1328 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affd, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
592. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
593. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), affd, 819 F.2d
927 (9th Cir. 1987).
594. See, eg., Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir.
1994). See also Great Am. Houseboat Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1986); Lake Berryessa
Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1978).
595. See, e.g., Humboldt County v. United States, 684 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
596. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985).
597. See, eg., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
598. See 3 PNRL, supranote 1, § 21.02[3].
599. Agency decisions have had the same effect. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. BLM, 140 IBLA 85
(1997) (overturning BLM decision allowing grazing in five Utah canyons due to its failure to balance competing resource values).
600. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996).
601. See Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.
1982).
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gered wildlife) in specific situations is likely to have a more significant effect in
narrowing agency discretion afforded by the multiple use statutes. The same is
true of the enactment of agency regulations, such as the environmental quality
standards increasingly applicable to hardrock mining operations,' and of
agency land use plans, to which subsequent management decisions must conform.

E. Minerals Management Decisions
The application of the mining and mineral leasing laws to activities on the
federal lands also has been affected by judicial interpretation. The courts have
been called upon to determine the scope of statutory programs such as the General Mining Law's hardrock mineral location scheme. In the 1978 case of
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.,"3 the Supreme Court declared that
water is not a locatable mineral. Two years later, it held that oil shale need not
be marketable at present to be patentable. 4 The courts also have assisted in
distinguishing between lode and placer claims, a crucial distinction for determining the size and shape of a GML claim. In 1977, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Stock-Raising Homestead Act's reservation of "coal and other minerals" included geothermal resources, rejecting in the process the Interior
Department's view that geothermal resources amounted to nothing more than
superheated water.6°7 Six years later, in Watt v. Western Nuclear, nc.,8 the

Supreme Court, relying on the statutory purpose of encouraging concurrent
development of surface and subsurface resources, determined that "other minerals" also includes gravel. The Tenth Circuit ruled in Aulston v. United
States6 and Exxon Corp. v. Lujan ° that carbon dioxide and helium are
covered by a federal oil and gas lease.
A series of cases have dealt with the GML's patenting process. In a 1980
decision,61' the Eighth Circuit ruled that issuance of a patent did not trigger
NEPA evaluation requirements because patenting is a ministerial act leaving the
surface management agency with no discretion to be affected by the environmental assessment. But the Court of Claims subsequently ruled that the right to
a valid patent is only an expectancy which Congress can eliminate without
incurring the obligation to compensate." 2 The Ninth Circuit confirmed in

602. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 25.04.
603. 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
604. See Andrus v. Shell Oil Corp., 446 U.S. 657 (1980).
605. See Webb v. Lujan, 960 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1992).
606. See 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1994).
607. See United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
930 (1978), rehearingdenied, 435 U.S. 911 (1978).
608. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
609. 915 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 916 (1991).
610. 970 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1992).
611. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
612. See Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
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Swanson v. Babbite"3 that vested rights arise only after full compliance with
the procedures for obtaining a patent.6"4 Substantial compliance will not suffice.6 '5 In Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, in 1997,616 the Tenth Circuit
held that the filing of a patent application with a state BLM office along with
all necessary papers required to process the application exempted the applicant
from a 1994 congressional moratorium on the issuance of mineral patents and
entitled the applicant to processing of its application." 7 In the Ninth Circuit's
decision of R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt" in the same year, the court held
that a patent applicant was not exempt from the moratorium given its failure to
tender payment of the purchase price before the effective date of the exemption. 619

The courts have addressed related issues under several statutes concerning
the right to issuance and the duration of mineral leases on the federal lands.
Efforts by those who had filed applications for prospecting permits to overturn
the Interior Department's moratorium on coal leasing failed, in part because
those filings afforded them no protectable rights."0 The D.C. Circuit ruled in
1979 that issuance of a lease to a prospecting permittee under the pre-1976 coal
leasing mechanisms is nondiscretionary if the lessee has satisfied all statutory
conditions, including the discovery of commercial quantities.62 ' But determinations of profitability had to take into account environmental restrictions imposed
on the lessee by the leasing agency. 6z2 In Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v.
Andrus,623 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Interior Department's failure to
provide timely notice to a FCLAA lessee of its intention to readjust lease terms
constituted a waiver of its right to do so.624 The same court later held that the

FCLAA automatically makes pre-FCLAA leases subject to adjustment at tenyear intervals from the first readjustment after the statute's adoption.6' The
D.C. Circuit held in Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrusas that the
Interior Secretary had no right to terminate a lease for nonproduction because

613. 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993).
614. See also Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1997) (vested rights do not
arise before the Interior Secretary has decided whether to contest a patent claim). But cf. Cook v. United
States, 37 Fed. CL 435 (1997) (patent applicants acquired equitable title by complying with statutory prerequisites and proposing purchase price which was accepted by the BLM).
615. See Red Top Mercury Mines, Inc. v. United States, 887 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1989).
616. 117 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1997).
617. See id. at 1171.
618. 113 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1997).
619. See id. at 1065.
620. See American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrs, 434 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Wyo. 1977). See also Hunter
v. Morton, 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
621. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berglund, 609 F.2d 553, 557 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
622. See id. at 555 n.3.
623. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
624. But cf. FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041
(1988) (notice sent before anniversary date was sufficient even though adjustment proceedings were not completed until after readjustment).
625. See Trapper Mining Co. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
626. 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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section 209 of the Mineral Leasing Act,627 which entitles leaseholders to an
extension if leases are suspended "in the interest of conservation," afforded the
leaseholder two more seasons of operations. The court interpreted "conservation" broadly to include more than unanticipated stoppages. 628 The Tenth Circuit distinguished Copper Valley in the 1997 Hoyl case,629 concluding that the
de facto suspension doctrine recognized in the earlier decision applies only
where the agency takes action which does not apply evenhandedly to leases in
other areas.6 3° For that reason, the mere preparation of an EIS did not occasion a de facto suspension.63' The court also held that the BLM properly considered the lack of a market for the coal which would be extracted from the
lease and the absence of authorization to mine as relevant factors in determining
whether to issue a suspension.6
The courts have been increasingly instrumental in the enforcement of statutory and regulatory restrictions on the rights of mining claimants, particularly
when those restrictions are designed to protect the environment. In United
States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc.6" the Ninth Circuit, relying on the Surface Resources Act of 1955,6" enjoined a locator from barring recreational
access across the surface of its claim. The same statute affords the Forest Service the power to prevent prospecting methods with environmentally destructive
potential.6' In Duncan Energy Co. v. United States Forest Service,6 the
Eighth Circuit upheld the Forest Service's authority to prevent the owner of
mineral rights in a national grasslands area from proceeding with exploration
absent agency approval of a surface use plan designed to afford the agency the
opportunity to perform an environmental assessment. In Clouser v. Epsy,' 7
the Ninth Circuit extended those holdings by allowing regulation on lands outside the boundaries of the mining claim, at least where another statute supplies
regulatory authority. The same court in United States v. Weiss,6 8 decided in
1981, interpreted the Forest Service Organic Act to vest in the agency sufficient
authority to impose reasonable regulations on miners with location claims. The
miners do not gain prescriptive rights to avoid regulation simply because the
agency long refrained from exercising those powers.6 39 BLM authority to regulate to prevent undue degradation was recognized in the 1988 decision of
Sierra Club v. Penfold.6
627. See 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1994).
628. See Copper Valley, 653 F.2d at 600-02.
629. See Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1383-84 (10th Cir. 1997).
630. See id. at 1384.

631. See id.
632. See id. at 1385.
633. 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980).
634. See 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1994).
635. See United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
See also United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
636. 50 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1995).
637. 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995).
638. 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981).
639. See id. at 299.
640. 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The Interior Department's responsibility to take steps to prevent oil and
gas leasing from damaging surface resources also has been the subject of considerable litigation. In Sierra Club v. Peterson,64' the D.C. Circuit held that
NEPA requires the leasing agency to draft a full EIS unless it includes in the
lease no surface occupancy stipulations prohibiting surface activities without the
agency's specific approval. In Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 2 the Ninth
Circuit required the leasing agency to consider the no action alternative before
leasing. The Tenth Circuit subsequently upheld lease issuance without an EIS in
Park County Resource Council v. United States Department of Agriculture, 3
but that decision is not necessarily inconsistent with Peterson and Bob Marshall
because the court appeared to assume the agency's ability to assess and mitigate
environmental damage. 6" The courts were more solicitous of leasing without
prior environmental assessment in the offshore leasing context.' The Ninth
Circuit in 1978 allowed casual use by geothermal lessees under the Geothermal
Steam Act to proceed based on a programmatic EIS, but indicated that sitespecific evaluation might be necessary at the "appropriate phase of development." 4
In some instances, business as usual prevailed despite the adoption of
statutory and regulatory revisions to the minerals disposition process. A good
example is the Powder River Coal case, 7 where the Ninth Circuit upheld a
series of coal leases, even though evidence produced by a federal commission
supported the conclusion that the tracts were not leased at fair market value as
required by the FCLAA."
VIII. LEGISLATIVE STALEMATES, 1981-1997

The pace of legislative change slowed considerably after 1980. Many of
the statutes that were adopted since that time have taken the form of modifications to existing statutory programs, such as the federal pollution control laws,
rather than of dramatic new initiatives. A 1997 statute defined for the first time
a mission for the National Wildlife Refuge System and elevated "wildlife-dependent recreational uses," including hunting and fishing, to a newly prominent
place in the hierarchy of permissible refuge uses. 9 With that notable exception, the essential mandates of the federal land management agencies have
remained basically unchanged during this period, although the lands under their
jurisdiction have increased or decreased with the creation of new national parks,

641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
1252.

717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989).
817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 23.02[4][b].
See Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
See Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978).
See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989).
See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 22.03[3][c].
See The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat.
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monuments, and wild and scenic rivers, and the designation of new wilderness areas."5 Relatively minor changes resulted from amendments to the ESA

in 19786 2 and 198263 and the National Historic Preservation Act in

1992.54 The rules governing timber sales changed after adoption of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act of 1984655

Congress suspended the application of environmental laws to timber sales
in a series of appropriations bills,ss culminating in the adoption of the 1995
salvage timber sale law.6 7 It also used appropriations bills to impose morato-

ria on the issuance of mineral patentss and the listing of endangered species.s

President Clinton vetoed an appropriations bill which would have

forced the Forest Service to adopt an LRMP for the Tongass National Forest
with mandatory, minimum timber sales.'
A few programs were subject to more lasting overhauls. The Reclamation
Reform Act of

19 8 2 66'

amended the processes by which and the standards

pursuant to which the Bureau of Reclamation allocates water from federal reclamation projects."2 The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 19 86 60 requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to afford more weight to fish

and wildlife protection purposes in the licensing of hydroelectric dams.664 The
National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 19866

converted many permits

granted under the authority of the 1897 Organic Act to a new system.6

The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act (FOOGLRA) of
1987667 amended the Mineral Leasing Act by establishing a new bidding and

leasing system for oil and gas.'

Competitive bidding at oral auction replaced

the simultaneous lottery system previously in effect.

The statute imposes

new limits on the size of tracts offered for competitive leasinge' and sets na-

650. In 1996, for example, President Clinton created the Grand Stairease-Escalante National Monument in
Utah using authority derived from the Antiquities Act. See Presidential Proclamation No. 6920, Establishment
of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
651. In 1994, for example, Congress designated about six million acres of the California Desert Conservation Area as wilderness. See Pub. L. No. 103-433, § 102, 108 Stat. 4473 (1994). See also GLICKsMAN &
COGGINS, supranote 30, at 323.
652. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
653. See Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1426 (1982).
654. See 2 PNRL, supra note 1, § 15B.05[3].
655. 16 U.S.C. § 618 (1994). See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 20.05[5].
656. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 20.03[2].
657. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194, 240 (1995) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1611).
658. See, eg., Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 112, 108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994).
659. See Margaret Kriz, Aiming for the Green, NAT'L J., Oct. 4, 1997, at 1958, 1959.
660. See Tongass Proviso Blamed for Money Woes; Interim Bill Okayed, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 2,
at 2 (Jan. 18, 1996).
661. See Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-1 (1994)).
662. See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 21B.04.
663. See Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243.
664. See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 21C.05.
665. See 16 U.S.C. § 497b (1994).
666. See 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 17.0413][b][i].
667. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified primarily at 30 U.S.C. §§ 188, 195, 226 (1994)).
668. See generally 3 PNRL, supra note 1, § 23.03.
669. See 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(B) (1994).
670. See id. § 226(b)(1)(A).
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tional minimum acceptable bids,6" rentals,' and royalties.673 Leases may
be forfeited for a variety of reasons, including failure to commence drilling
within the primary lease term 4 and failure to comply with lease terms and
applicable laws.67s The Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
1982'6 authorizes the Interior Department to audit oil and gas lessee operations to facilitate calculation and collection of lease royalties.6"
A few entirely new programs have surfaced. In 1983 Congress created the
"rails-to-trails" program, which authorized the conversion of abandoned railroad
rights-of-way to recreational use." It abolished other programs, eliminating
both the National Biological Survey6" and the Interior Department's Bureau
of Mines in 1995.680
The most dramatic changes in federal public land law in recent years,
however, have been the ones that have not been adopted. Following the election
of Republican majorities in the 1994 congressional elections, which featured the
Contract with America formulated largely by House Speaker Gingrich, a series
of bills were introduced whose effect would have been to restore elements of
earlier eras of federal public land management. The objective, stated or unstated, of many such bills was "to open public lands more to commodity uses.""
One category of bills sought to end federal ownership or management of
public lands or to switch the governing federal land management agency from
one subject to a preservation-oriented mandate to one subject to multiple use
management standards. The bills authorizing the states to demand the transfer
of all BLM lands located within their boundaries"2 would have codified the
agenda of the County Supremacists and Wise Users and turned back the clock
all the way to the pre-New Deal Disposition Era."3 Similarly, legislation was
proposed that would have allowed the states to seek title to Forest Service lands
after ten years of state management 4 and that would have transferred jurisdiction over the national grasslands from the Forest Service to the Secretary of
671. See id. § 226(b)(1)(B).
672. See id. § 226(d).
673. See id. § 226(b)(1)(A).
674. See id. § 226(e).
675. See id. § 188(a).
676. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1994).
677. See id. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Lujan, 963 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1992), addresses the scope of
the agency's auditing authority, which it has delegated to the Minerals Management Service. See also Santa
Fe Energy Prod. Co. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 1996).
678. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
679. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Spending Bill Would Reverse Nation'sEnvironment Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1995, at Al, C19 (nat'l ed.).
680. See 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1378-79 (December 5, 1995).
681. See Murkowski, Craig Haven'tForgottenAmbitious ForestPlans, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 2, at
5 (Jan. 18, 1996).
682. See, e.g., H.R. 2032, 104th Cong., (1995); S.1031, 104th Cong., (1995).
683. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Case Against Transferring BLM Lands to the States, VII
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 387 (1996); Michael C. Blumm & Jonathan Lovvom, The Proposed Transfer ofBLM
Timber Lands to the State of Oregon: Environmental and Economic Questions, XXXII LAND & WATER L.
REV. 353 (1997).
684. See Craig ForestryBill Would Rewrite Much ofNFMA and FLPMA, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No.
24, at 1 (Dec. 12, 1996). The same bill would have repealed the RPA. Id.
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Agriculture.' A California legislator introduced a bill to switch lands designated in 1994 as a national preserve back to BLM public lands. A measure
designed to provide incentives for the federal government to sell public lands
would have allowed Congress to attribute sale revenues toward budget reductions, even though the sales ultimately might cost the government money. a 7
The same bill would have authorized the sale of national forest lands used for
ski operations to the operators0' Had any of these bills been adopted, the inevitable (and intended) result would have been increased mining and mineral
leasing activity.
Another category of proposed legislation took the form of efforts to eliminate or subordinate procedures and substantive controls constraining development. Western Senators proposed legislation to remove restrictions derived from
land use planning, environmental assessment, and endangered species protection
requirements that hindered the Forest Service's ability to offer allowable sales
quantities of timber.a 9 Such legislation would essentially codify and expand

on a permanent basis some aspects of the 1995 salvage timber sale bill, which
exempted those sales from environmental constraints. 690 Another bill proposed
to give livestock interests more control over the establishment of grazing policies and to prohibit environmental reviews upon renewal of permits."' Two
Western Senators introduced a bill to reverse proposed Interior Department
regulations by shifting to the government the burden of proving that right-ofway claims based on R.S. 2477 are invalid.0 The Senate passed a bill in
1997 allowing states to use relatively lenient standards to validate these rightsof-way.69
President Clinton's 1996 designation of the Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in Utah prompted the introduction of bills, one of which was passed
by the House of Representatives, to limit sharply the President's withdrawal
power under the Antiquities Act"64 Enactment of such legislation would
weaken if not negate a statute symbolic of much of what transpired during the
Conservation Era. A less sweeping proposal would have opened the Arctic
685. See Same Story: Domenici Team Talking to Dems About Range Bill, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 2,
at 6 (Jan. 18, 1996).
686. See Rep. Lewis Working on Plan to Transfer Mojave to BLM, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 1, at 5
(Jan. 4, 1996).
687. See GOP Working on FederalLand Disposalon Several Fronts,20 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 22, at
4 (Nov. 9,1995).
688. See id.
689. See CraigBill to Rewrite FS Policy May Grab Early Headlines, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 22, at
4 (Nov. 14, 1996).
690. See Craig, AdministrationBash Each Other Over ForestPolicy, 22 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 6, at
3-4 (Mar. 20, 1997).
691. See New Draft Domenici Range Bill Due; Grazing Fee Hits Bottom, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 3,
at 5 (Feb. 1, 1996).
692. See S. 1425, 104th Cong. (1995).
693. See Senate Okays GOP Plan to Let State Law Judge RS 2477 Roads, 22 PUBLIC LAND NEWS No.
10, at 1 (May 15, 1997).
694. See Neil A. Lewis, House Tweaks Clinton on Creating Monuments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at
A14, col. 4 (nat'l ed.). See also James Brooke, Utah Is Warming Up to Newest Monument, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1997, at A8, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); HR. 1127, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas development.' 5 President
Clinton vetoed an appropriations bill to that effect in 1995.1
Efforts to revoke other Preservation Era initiatives took the form of proposals to amend the ESA. Some bills would have overturned the Supreme
Court's decision in the Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities of a
Great Oregon. 7 by limiting the definition of harm in the Act's taking prohibition to direct actions that kill or injure individual members of listed species."5 Others would have vested in the states veto power over species listing
decisions.' Still others would have required the federal government to compensate landowners whose property values were diminished by more than twenty percent as a result of the ESA's application7re and eliminated the requirement that action agencies consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service on actions
with the potential to jeopardize listed species or their habitats."' More moderate bills would have required the Interior Secretary to cooperate with private
landowners to minimize the economic impact of regulation through the adoption
of habitat conservation plans; authorized the use of tradable development rights
so that developers could receive permission to build on certain lands in exchange for agreeing not to develop critical habitat and other lands important for
species preservation; and provide for peer review of the science upon which
ESA decisionmaking is based." 2
Efforts to adopt a new wave of preservation-oriented legislation or to eliminate well-entrenched but unjustified subsidies were equally unsuccessful. Some
proposed legislation would have expanded the lands subject to preservationoriented management. A 1997 bill, responding to earlier efforts to open up the
ANWR to leasing, would have designated the 1.5 million acre plain as wilderness. 3 Another bill would have protected 20 million acres in the Northern
Rockies as wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, and related protected lands categories."

Other bills would have enhanced existing management standards designed
to forestall or mitigate environmental harm. The Clinton Administration intro-

695. See 1996 Outlook: Lands InitiativesMay Have to Go It Alone, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEws No. 2, at 6
(Jan. 18, 1996).
696. See ANWR Still a Budget Sticking Point Between Hill, Clinton, 21 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 1, at 8
(Jan. 4, 1996).
697. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
698. See, eg., S. 768, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. (1995).
699. See John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands, 32
LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 592 (1997).
700. See H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., (1995). Similar compensation schemes were proposed for the dredge
and fill permit program under the Clean Water Act as it applies to wetlands development. See Robert L.
Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, RegulatoryReform and (Breach of) the Contract With America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y # 2 (winter
1996), at 9, 22.
701. See CraigLand Use Bill May Not Hit the Streets Until September, 22 PUBLIC LAND NEWS No. 12,
at 4 (June 12, 1997).
702. See Turner & Rylander, supranote 698, at 588-604. See also Kriz, supra note 658, at 1959.
703. See ANWR Bills Emerging Again; Oil DiscoveriesA New Factor,22 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS No. 8, at
8 (Apr. 17, 1997).
704. See H.R. 1425, 105th Cong. (1997).
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duced legislation to increase the base grazing fee and to place a greater emphasis on the adverse environmental consequences of grazing on the public range-

lands.7) When that legislation foundered, the Administration sought to
achieve some of its goals administratively through the implementation of
Rangeland Reform '94'

A plethora of bills aimed at reforming the General Mining Law to mitigate
environmental spillovers attributable to hardrock mining likewise died a quiet
death, although one was passed overwhelmingly by the House in 1993. 70 An
effort to block administrative efforts to accomplish the same result"5 was the
upshot of a 1997 appropriations rider.7 A recent bill71° would require min-

ers to finance a fund to remediate contaminated abandoned mines. A similar
fund already exists for abandoned surface coal mines under the SMCRA.'

Proposed legislation to increase royalty payments to the government also got
nowhere.71 2 Environmentalists introduced their own versions of ESA reform

which, among other things, would have precluded consideration of economic
impact until after critical habitat designation, during the formulation of habitat
conservation plans, 713 required designation of critical habitat contemporaneously with listing, and established deadlines for key statutory decisions. 7 4

IX. CONCLUSION
The French saying to the effect that the more things change, the more they
stay the same, has particular relevance to federal public land and natural re-

sources law. Assumptions and premises change; legislation is repealed or
amended; new administrations bring new public land priorities; and courts an-

nounce new doctrines or new emphases. Yet the same conflicts evident for over
200 years remain unresolved. These conflicts, among others, continue to pit:
"federal vs. state governments;
* Republicans vs. Democrats;
705. See S. 1459, 104th Cong. (1995). See Karl N. Arruda & Christopher Watson, The Rise and Fall of
Grazing Reform, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 413, 428 (1997).
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" Eastern states vs. Western states;
"Liberals vs. conservatives;
"Federal agencies vs. each other;
" Environmentalists vs. commodity users;
• Conservationists vs. preservationists;
" Exploitative vs. controlled uses;
"Public interests vs. private interests.
The evolution of public natural resources law generally has proceeded from
disposition to conservation to preservation, but none of these eras is discrete or
exclusive: some elements of each always have been present, though in differing
ways and emphases. One starkly unfortunate result of this evolution has been
the proliferation of statutes and other legal authorities-many of which were
ignored or barely touched on, even in this overly lengthy paper. As stated at the
beginning, the law in 1998 is in some respects an unholy mess because of its
prolixity, conflict, lack of clarity, definition or uniformity, unavailability, complexity, obsolescence, inefficiency, and unfairness.
No one designed the law this way. It is the product of a history characterized by ad hoc responses to perceived problems over time without any real
attempt to reconcile the new with the old or to aggregate the disparate parts into
a coherent whole. The nation still is operating in that disjointed, accumulative
fashion as senators and representatives introduce myriad individual bills on
myriad separate subjects in this area.
In general outline, at least, a rough balance seems to have been struck
among the various contenders, and it is best described as inertia in favor of the
status quo; the all-powerful Congress lacks the ability or desire to institute
radical change in any direction. Current reform proposals are pale imitations of
the notions floated by both sides just a few years ago, from repeal of the General Mining Law at one end of the spectrum to disposing of the federal lands at
the other.
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